



T.C.

NEVŞEHİR HACIBEKTAŞ VELİ UNIVERSITY

SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND TERRORISM PROGRAM

**AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (2007-2022):
AN ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES**

Master's Thesis

ABDIWALI ABDIKADIR FARAH

SUPERVISOR:

Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat DEMİREL

Nevşehir

August 2023



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COMPLIANCE WITH SCIENTIFIC ETHIC

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Thesis prepared by

Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah

SUITABILITY FOR GUIDE

The master's thesis, entitled "African Union Mission in Somalia (2007-2022): An Assessment of Challenges" has been prepared according to the postgraduate thesis proposal and thesis writing guidelines of Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University.

Prepared by

Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah

Supervisor

Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat DEMİREL

Head of International Security and Terrorism

Program

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlhan ARAS

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This study, titled “African Union Mission in Somalia (2007-2022): An Assessment of Challenges”, was prepared by Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah under the supervision of Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat DEMİREL, it has been accepted as a thesis by our jury in the International Security and Terrorism Program of Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Institute of Social Sciences.

..... / /

JURY

SIGNATURE

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Murat DEMİREL

.....

Member: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Abdullah ÖZDAG

.....

Member: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Onur
TEPECİKLİOĞLU

.....

APPROVAL:

This thesis has been accepted by the Graduate School Administrative Board, with the decision no..... on..... / /

..... / /

.....

Director of the Institution

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to send a heartfelt and highest appreciation to my thesis supervisor as well as my lecturer Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat DEMİREL who guided and supported me in researching this topic at the best. Secondly, a thankful message is directed to the International Security and Terrorism Department members and lecturers who equipped me with new knowledge and experience.

I would like to humbly and honestly beholden my success to Türkiye Bursları and Yurtdışı Türkler Ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığına (YTB). I could not have made this achievement without providing a scholarship and hosting me in Türkiye with the great hospitality and dignity you offered me during my studies journey. To my Turkish people, you have a solid position in my life and I will forever be your bred son.

I dedicated this milestone accomplishment to my beloved young brother Mohamoud Abdikadir Farah (Copra) whom I wished to be a witness on this day but due to destiny lost his life in a car accident in Mogadishu last year. The late Mohamoud was not only my young brother but a candle in my life and my motive to move forward. Brother, I can't express words for how grateful and gifted you were for my life and I will always love you from the bottom of my heart and cherish the memories we had together.

Last but not least, I am expressing my gratitude to my Mohamed Abdille family especially Dr Mohamud Garre who psychologically supported me in hard times and other dignities that helped me to get this work done. To my classmates, thanks for the friendship, brotherhood and sisterhood you gave me during this amazing journey which was unforgettable, admirable and estimable.

Thank you all.

Abdiwali Farah

Afrika Birliđi'nin Somali Misyonu (2007-2022): Zorlukların Bir Analizi

Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah

**Neveřhir Hacı Bektař Veli Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası
Güvenlik ve Terörizm Ana Bilim Dalı, Yüksek Lisans, Temmuz 2023**

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Murat DEMİREL

ÖZET

Otuz yılı aşkın süredir çatışmaların sürdüđü Somali'de, ülke henüz hala istikrarı sağlayamamıştır. Güç rekabeti, klan dinamikleri ve terörizm Somali'deki mevcut çatışmalar arasında öne çıkan başlıca sorunlardır. İstikrarı sağlamaya yönelik Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) müdahalesi gibi çeşitli girişimler çatışmanın üstesinden gelebilmek amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiş ve bu girişimler arasında 2007 yılında kurulan Afrika Birliđi Somali Misyonu (AMISOM) da yer almaktadır. Bu çalışma ile AMISOM'un 2007–2022 yılları arasında hangi zorluklarla karşılaştığı araştırma sorusu çerçevesinde AMISOM'un 2007–2022 yılları arasında karşılaştığı bu zorlukların bir değerlendirmesinin yapılması amaçlanmaktadır. Mevcut literatür AMISOM'un federal hükümeti koruduđunu, Al-Shabaab'ı Mogadiřu'dan söküp attığını ve insani yardım için güvenli bir paket sunduđunu göstermektedir. Aynı zamanda çalışma, AMISOM'un aktif bir savaş esnasında çalışmalarına başlaması, çevresel ve lojistik sorunlarla mali sıkıntılar gibi zorluklarla karşılaştığını ortaya koymuştur. Yerel bir ortađın yokluđu ve asker gönderen ülkelerin çatışan çıkarları, bölünmüş komuta kademeleri ve sektör bölünmeleri misyonun ilerlemesini etkilemiştir. Somali Ulusal Ordusu (SNA) ile ilişkilerin kopuk olması ve misyonun İleri Harekât Üslerinin (FOB'lar) güvenlik açıkları teröristlerin üslere saldırılar düzenlemesine olanak sağlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AMISOM, Eř-Şebab, Terörizm, Somali, Afrika Birliđi (AU)

African Union Mission in Somalia (2007-2022): An Assessment of challenges

Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah

**Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli University, Institute of Social Sciences
International Security and Terrorism Department, M.S., July 2023**

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Murat DEMİREL

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Somalia lasted over three decades and the country is not stable yet. Power competition, clan dynamics, and terrorism are the most notable issues in Somalia's conflict. Several stabilization attempts such as UN intervention were established to tackle the conflict and among these efforts was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which was founded in 2007. This study aimed to conduct an assessment of challenges in AMISOM (2007-2022) in the research question of what are the challenges AMISOM faced between 2007 and 2022. The current literature presents that AMISOM protected the Federal government, uprooted Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, and provided a safe package for humanitarian delivery. The study also found that AMISOM faced numerous challenges such as the mission started during an active war, environmental and logistical problems, and financial issues. The absence of a local partner and conflicting interests from troop-contributing countries, disunified command posts and sector divisions affected the progress of the mission. There was a broken relationship with the Somali National Army (SNA) and the vulnerabilities of the mission's Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) enabled terrorists to carry out attacks on the bases.

Keywords: AMISOM, Al-Shabaab, Terrorism, Somalia, African Union (AU)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU:	African Union
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS:	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AIAI:	Al-Ittihad Al Islamiyah
EU:	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
SNA	Somali National Army
SSDF:	Somali Selvation Democratic Front
SNM:	Somali National Movements
TNG	Transitional National Government
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TCC:	Troops Contributing Countries
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UCU:	Union of Islamic Courts
UNOSOM:	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC:	United Somali Congress

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INTRODUCTION

The central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991 and the country was mangled by civil wars and terrorism. Al-Shabaab rose under the leadership of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007 and posed a threat to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This led to the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission, which consisted of troops from Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, and Burundi, lasted from 2007 until 2022 when it changed to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The AMISOM mission faced significant challenges as Somalia has been insecure since the mission started, with several factors contributing to this pessimism. The mission-contributing countries did not have a good start as the troop-contributing countries (TCC) had a different agenda. The troop-contributing countries were primarily motivated by financial interest (Mahmood and Ani, 2017: 17). There were disagreements between the AU and UN over whether a military peace operation was an appropriate response to the conditions in Mogadishu in early 2007 and external actors did not have united thoughts on how to engage the situation in Somalia (Williams, 2013: 223). In addition to that, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon doubted that the deployment of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia was 'neither realistic nor viable' due to the precarious security (Mahmood and Ani, 2017: 17).

However, the reason why over fifteen years AMISOM did not fully stabilize Somalia seems to be understudied. Therefore, this study attempts to fill that gap to a certain extent and explore whether the AMISOM has contributed to the stabilization of Somalia and what factors blocked the mission from fully delivering its assigned tasks in Somalia by conducting a critical assessment of the mission's goals. Thus, the research question that this study focuses on is (what are the challenges that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) faced? Researching this topic aims to

produce worthy and empirical knowledge that will contribute to the literature on Somalia's stability and AMISOM.

The study has found that the mission started with the existence of a dilemma in the mission's success and met a hostile environment whereby it entered into an active war. The planning strategy seems poor and the reality on the ground was not fully assessed. There was a division and conflicting interests between troops-contributing countries. The most mentionable countries were the neighbouring countries that prioritized their national interest first. Since these countries focused on their target, the main mission ambitions were lost and therefore the mission progress before 2015 was deemed low.

For the operational stage, the mission had logistical and financial challenges. This was a deadlock for the mission expansion, and continuity of the operations, and hardened the AMISOM to conduct its mandated duties while the disunification of command posts and sector divisions centred the TCCs directly to their contingents and was giving orders and guidelines from their soldier. On the other hand, the cooperation and relations between SNA and AMISOM were broken as a result of mistrust that existed. This hurt the mission to work smoothly and execute its work. It also passed to the current transitional mission ATMIS. Since AMISOM was divided into sectors, the troops stationed in their bases and stuck to remain in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This static action gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity and conduct offensive and complex attacks on AMISOM bases which latest was the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) base in the Buulo-Mareer.

The study has also noted that AMISOM troops were involved in misconduct acts and civilian casualties. The literature showed that AMISOM contingents from the UPDF were caught red-handed for selling their provided logistics and hardware and sentenced in Mogadishu. Similarly, the UPDF members were found guilty of killing civilians in Golweyn village in 2021, hence, a death sentence was condemned by the court.

The study shows that AMISOM was divided into sectors, the troops were stationed in their bases and remained in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This static action gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity and conduct offensive and complex attacks on AMISOM bases which latest was the UPDF base in the Buulo-Mareer.

The first chapter of this study will cover a general understanding of the Somalia conflict. It will start with an overview of the root causes of the Somalia conflict, then the chronology of the conflict occasions that occurred in the country. This chapter will discuss the 1969 military coup which was the only successful coup in the country's history, the Ogaden War and its implication for Somalia will be explained. Then, the rise of the rebel groups and the result of the warlords and civil war. The reconciliation conference and the transitional government will be discussed. The United Nation's operations in Somalia will be discussed. The Ethiopian invasion and the emergency of Islamist groups such as Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab will be discussed. Addressing the conflict in Somalia would help the study to present the challenges that the mission encountered since AMISOM worked in these conflicts.

The second chapter will emphasise the AMISOM mission foundation, Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs), the sources of the mission's funds and sectors that were divided into the troops. The chapter will further the organizational structure of the mission and mandate that was assigned by the Security Council resolutions such as 1477 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2073 (2012), 2182 (2014), 2297 (2016), 2372 (2017) 2472 (2019) and 2628 (2022) on ATMIS.

The third chapter will present the assessment of the mission achievement and the challenges that it encountered. The chapter will start with the mission achievements such as the protection of the government and operations it carried out. include contributing countries' interests in the mission, the disunification of the chain command and the implication of the sector division. The chapter will look at the operational challenges and if the mission received enough resources, and cooperation with local forces. Moreover, this chapter will first examine the division and conflicting interests among troops contributed to countries, and then, it will discuss a dilemma in the mission's success and the hostile environment that it started. It

further discusses the logistical and financial challenges that the mission faced. After that, it will concentrate on the impact of the disunified command post and sector divisions. Then, it delves into the broken relationship with the Somali National Army (SNA), misconduct and civilian casualties and it will finally look at the vulnerable Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).



CHAPTER ONE

SOMALIA CONFLICT

This chapter aims to summarize the conflict in Somalia since its statehood in 1960. The conflict in Somalia had stages and seemed complex, thus giving an overview of Somalia's conflict meant to enable and give an easy understanding of the reason that the AMISOM mission was needed in the first place. Thus, the chapter will present the main cause of the conflict, and the actors involved. Highlighting the causes of the conflict in Somalia would enable an easy understanding of the challenges that AMISOM faced and give a comprehensive overview of the situation that Somalia went through until the involvement of AMISOM was needed.

It will briefly explain the international actors' attempts to tackle this conflict and stabilize Somalia. The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) will be noted. This will lead to expanding the concept and role stakeholders play in stable Somalia. However, an invasion from a neighbouring country would also be discussed. This is meant to show the impact of these invasions and the result that they brought to Somalia's situation.

The emergency of armed Islamist groups such as Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyah (AIAD), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab will be addressed to highlight their role in the conflicts. To further clarify, Al-Shabaab was the reason that the AMISOM mission was established. Therefore, ground understanding is needed for this study.

Somalia's conflict is a multi-dimensional issue and involves different actors. The conflict in Somalia could be summarized in power competition, clan dynamics, terrorism, foreign interventions and a weak central government. The armed actors

comprise clan militias and armed terrorist groups but throughout history apart from terrorism, inter-clan conflicts used to be resolved through traditions, norms and customs. After a struggle and freedom movements, Somalia gained independence from European imperialism. In the mid-1960s, two Somali regions colonized by the British Empire and Italy joined together and formed the Somali Republic (www.Encyclopedia.com, n.d.).

In 1960, the country cultivated a democratic and unified constitution, elected a president and applied a parliamentary governance system, however, disagreement started with the formation of the republic as a secessionism incident occurred within the first year, a group of northern military officers who were not happy with the Republic staged a failed coup in the north (Adam, 1992: 17).

Scholars gave numerous features of the root causes of Somalia's volatility. Dustin Dehéz and Belachew Gebrewold argue that the origins of Somali conflicts originated from two fundamental causes: clan dynamics, and warlords (Dehéz and Gebrewold, 2010: 4). On the other hand, Christian Webersik states that the conflict in Somalia could be understood as a struggle for political power and private gains (Webersik, 2014: 279). With Webersik's argument, Afyare Abdi Elmi and Dr Abdullahi Barise agree on some points as they note that the reason for the existence of clan local militias is the power struggle and resources. Long before Somalia had become a state, the inter-clan clashes in rural areas were led by the need for access to resources such as water wells, livestock mainly camels and grazing areas. Although the inter-clan conflict still occurs, there are widely accepted legal systems (*Heer*) that Somali traditional elders use to settle these conflicts (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 3).

Since Somalia state was formed in 1960, the power struggle destabilized the country. Several events including the assassination of the president, coup, and armed rebellion occurred in the first thirty years of the statehood.

Chronology: Contemporary Somalia Conflict

NO	Occasion	Involved Actors	Year
1	Failed Military Coup (1)	North-western Military Officers	1962
2	Military Coup led by Gen. Said Barre (2)	Military Officers	1969
3	Ogaden War	Somalia and Ethiopia	1977-78
4	Failed Military Coup (3) led by Col. Cirro	North-eastern Military Officers	1978
5	Formation of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)	Military Officers	1978
6	Formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM)	Military Officers	1981
7	Formation of the United Somali Congress (USC)	Military Officers	1987
8	State Collapse and Civil War	Rebels	1991
9	Warlords	Armed Militias	1991-2006
10	United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNITAF)	UN and USA	1993-1994
11	Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyah	Religious group	1984-1997
12	Ethiopian Invasion (1)	Ethiopia	1996
13	Arta Peace Conference and establishment of Transitional National Government ¹	Djibouti government, AU and UN	2000
14	Mbagathi Conference and formation of Transitional Federal Government	Ethiopia, Kenya, AU and the UN	2004
15	Formation Islamic Union Courts (IUC)	Prominent Clerics	2006
16	Ethiopian Invasion (2)	Ethiopia and USA	2006
17	Emergency of Al-Shabaab	The extremist wing of the ICU	2007
18	Formation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	African Union	2007
19	African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)	Somalia, AU and UN	2022

Adapted from (www.abcnews.go.com, n.d., Prunier, 1996: 42, Omar, 2006: 175), and (Vinci, 2010: 80).

This chronology shows that armed conflict has been imminent in Somalia since the formation of the state in 1962. The army was the main actor in these forceful attempts to change the system in the first thirty years of the republic. However, the 1969 military coup 2 was the only successful coup that occurred in Somalia, the rest

failed. The Ogaden War was the biggest clash that Somalia and Ethiopia had, thus, since Somalia was defeated the consequence of this war brought the establishment of armed rebels and finally ousted Gen. Siad Barre's government. This table presents that the UN, AU and the US were involved in the stabilization of Somalia since the collapse of the state and the beginning of the civil war. The Islamist groups have been emerging since 1984 until the collapse of the government in 1991, Meanwhile, Ethiopia invaded Somalia two times to destroy these Islamist groups but the widest and longest operation against these armed groups were AMISOM which was active for over fifteen years and later replaced with ATMIS.

1.1. 1969 Military Coup

On 21st October 1969, fifteen days after the assassination of democratically elected president Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, a group of high-ranking military officials headed by Major-General Mohamed Said Barre successfully seized power in a bloodless coup d'état. Abdi Ismail Samatar notes that the country's constitution was nullified, and several prominent politicians including former democratically elected president Aden Abdulle Osman and the Prime Minister of Somalia were arrested (Samatar, 2016: 204-213).

Brian J. Hesse mentions that the coup leaders introduced the formation of the Revolutionary Council and shifted the governance system to Marxism. All political parties were banned and after two years, the junta declared Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRCP) (Hesse, 2010). The Revolutionary junta's actions marked a decisive turn in Somali state development most fundamental changes befallen institutions as the 'Rule of the Game' and 'Rule of the Mind' was standardized (Balthasar, 2018: 148).

The significance of this coup and the reason that it was added to this chapter is that this coup was the only successful coup that ever happened in Somalia. It was the longest-ruling government in Somalia and throughout its era, several incidents such as the Ogaden War, the establishment of rebel groups and the collapse of the state had happened. These incidents had impacts on Somalia's conflict. Therefore, the bellow subtitles will further explain these implications.

1.2. The Ogaden War

In 1977 Somalia attacked and started a full-scale war against Ethiopia with the motive of reuniting Greater Somali (Ogaden War) and it failed, This was the turning point in Somalia's history as members of the Somalia National Army (SNA) tried to overthrow the Barre regime but were unsuccessful and armed rebel groups based in Ethiopia struggled with regime change until the state collapsed in 1991 (Hesse, 2010).

The socialist alliance including the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Yemen sided with Ethiopia and brought troops underground to stop the expansion of Somalia's army. It was reported that these troops fought side by side with the Ethiopian army, trained and equipped with heavy arms and helped them to defeat Somalia. This action came after Somalia ejected Soviet trainers, diplomats and other officials from the country by ordering them to leave effectively (Omer, 2018: 63).

The Somali military's 1978 withdrawal from Ogaden had an impact on the country. The war had negative implications other than military casualties in Somalia. Meanwhile, the economy was declining while the public's distrust and sentiment against the government developed. The state was getting weak and under these conditions, the civil war was edging to Somalia (www.worldview.stratfor.com, 2016). The rebel groups emerged and started an armed rebellion against the government of Gen. Siad Barre.

1.3. Rebel Groups

In 1978, a group of military officers plotted a military coup d'état to overthrow Gen. Barre's regime but was unsuccessful. The late-executed Col. Ciro who was among the leading figures was captured while Col. Abdillahi Yusuf fled to Kenya and then to Ethiopia and formed the first armed opposition front. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was hosted and given a base in Ethiopia and conducted guerrilla attacks on the Somali National Army. The Military government responded with the punishment of clan lineage of SSDF members (Prunier, 1996: 42).

The Somali National Movement (SNM) front was founded after SSDF, This rebel aimed to liberate the northwest region of the Siyad Barre regime. However, it was reported that the undisclosed agenda of this movement was to session their region from the rest of Somalia. This became clear once the break-away region of Somaliland was declared in 1991 and yet sought to be a separate and independent state from the rest of Somalia (Prunier, 1996,: 42).

In the mid-1980s, the United Somali Congress (USC) joined the rebel groups. This group was mainly dominated by fighters from South-Central Somalia including inhabitants of the capital Mogadishu. USC managed to enter the capital city in January 1991 and forced President Siyad Barre to flee from the statehouse. Although the front broke down into factions and hardly unable and lost control of its fighters, the nightmare was their gloomy conflict about who would be their leaders as two prominent leaders emerged from USC, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aided and late Somali President Ali Mahdi (Omar, 2006: 175).

Table 1. Clan politics and clan armies (Lewis, 1980: 221 and Torrenzano, 1995: 88-112) cited by (Ssereo, 2003:. 35)

Name of Political Armed Faction	Clan
Somali Social Democratic Front, SSDF	Marjeteen
Somaliland National Movement, SNM	Isaaq
Somalia Patriotic Movement, SPM	Ogaden
United Somali Congress, USC	Habr-Gedir (Hawiye)
United Somalia Congress, USC	Hawiye-Abgal (Hawiye)
Somalia National Alliance, SDA	Hawiye
Somali Democratic Movement, SDM	Digil, Rahawein
Somali Democratic Alliance, SDA	Gadabursi
United Somali Party, USP	Dolbahante
United Somali Front, USF	Esa

This table indicates that the clan militias gained a significant number after the first three rebels overthrew the military government. This armed militia faction was grouped into clan lineage for example the USC was divided into two groups and SDA was from the Hawiye clan, while SSDF, SPM and USP were from the Darood clan. The Degil had SPM, while the Esa, Isaaq and Gadabursi who hail from the Dir clan had SNM, SDA and USF. The most dominant and popular factions were USC

which was stationed in Mogadishu, SSDF which was based in the north-eastern and SNA in the north-west of the country.

1.4. Civil War And Warlords

The state collapse opened doors for inter-clan conflict and the whole country hosted a civil war. Since the legitimate and power-dominance government was overthrown by militias armies, the country fell into chaos and struggled for the fittest. Several clan militias broke out and were seeking dominance and influence. The chaos empowered local warlords controlling armed clan-lineage militias. These warlords became independent from clan political, social and economic structure. They succeeded in monopolising the loyalty of fighters and using the militia for personal political ambitions which signify the personal, often political, goals of the warlords themselves (Vinci, 2010: 80).

The hardest time in Somalia's civil war was between 1991-9. The clan-based militias formed by warlords struggled to gain control of strategic towns, seaports and neighbourhoods. The World Bank report stated

The wars, which began as a struggle for control of the government, quickly degenerated into predatory looting, banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering clan militias. Young gunmen fought principally to secure war booty and were under only the loosest control of militia commanders. Powerful merchants and warlords were implicated in this war economy too. The principal victims of this violence were weak agricultural communities and coastal minority groups caught in the middle of the fighting. Looted of all their belongings, they faced a massive famine in late 1991 and early 1992, prompting large international relief operations. The food aid quickly became part of the war economy, a commodity over which militias fought and that warlords diverted to fund the wars. An estimated 250,000 Somalis died in this war and famine (WorldBank, 2005: 9)

Both the World Bank report and Anthony Vinci's article show that Warlords fuelled the flame of civil war in Somalia. The deadly clash of the warlords resulted in a

humanitarian catastrophe but the warlord's side was economically beneficiary and power gain in Somalia.

1.5. Reconciliation Conferences And Transitional Governments

Reconciliation conferences backed by the UN, AU and neighbouring countries were held for Somalia. In 2000, the first Transitional National Government (TFG) was formed in Arta Djibouti but this government met gridlocked challenges. This conference was organized by Djiboutian President Ismail Omer Guelleh and brought around 2,000 Somali participants. The main rhetoric of the conference was the exclusion of warlords and thus main figures in Mogadishu did not receive ministerial positions in Transitional National Governments (Lewis, 2003: 213).

In Mbagati Kenya, the second Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established. These governments were shaped in the 4.5 formula, a type of power-sharing that the so-called four major clans (Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Digil & Mirifle) would have equal representation in the parliament while other clans considered minorities and would get half. This was a new political framework for Somalia (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019).

The third Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in Djibouti after President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed resigned. This time, the new president was a moderate Islamist, former chairman of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The president was the leading chair of the Courts wing who had a negotiation with the Transitional Federal Government (www.bbc.com, 2009).

Somalia ended the Transitional governments and moulded a permanent government in 2012. A move commended by the UN's late Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon at the Istanbul Somali Conference (www.news.un.org, 2012), in this transition, Somalia elected president to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Bayoumy, 2012)

1.6. United Nations Operations In Somalia (UNOSOM I And UNOSOM II, UNITAF)

The collapse of Gen. Siad Barre's government and the outbreak of the civil war brought the appointment of a special envoy from the UN to Somalia for conflict resolution in 1991. The armed faction supported the appointment of the envoy and welcomed it. The humanitarian situation in the country was deteriorating as around one million people became refugees while the other five million's life was in danger of hunger and disease. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the country whereas the Secretary-General organized peace and the parties agreed on a ceasefire. To monitor the ceasefire and the protection of the humanitarian convoys, the UN established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM I). Outgoing conflict and insecurity hardened the steadiness of humanitarian assistance, therefore, the Council decided to deploy 3,000 troops for the protection of humanitarian aid but the situation worsened as aid workers attacked while the famine endangered the lives of 1.5 million people. The U.S. offered to lead and organize the operation for the delivery of the humanitarian assistance. The council authorized the use of "all necessary means" to provide a secure environment for the humanitarian mission. Thereafter, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established and contingents from 24 countries led by the US were organized (www.peacekeeping.un.org, Somalia-UNOSOM I background, n.d.).

The armed factions agreed on a ceasefire and to hand over the weapons to UNITAF and UNISOM. The UN decided to transfer the mission from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the new mission was established to continue the delivery of humanitarian aid by all necessary means and further mandated the reconstruction of social, political and economic in Somalia. However, the faction did not implement the ceasefire as 24 soldiers from Pakistan were killed by militiamen in June 1993. In October, another clash between militiamen and Quick Reaction Forces of the US which were not members of the UNISOM resulted in the death of 18 US soldiers. This led to US withdrawal of the US from the mission, followed by Belgium, France and Sweden. The mission was concluded in March 1995 (www.peacekeeping.un.org, n.d.).

The United Nations (UN), the United States and Somalia's neighbouring countries' involvement in Somalia's peace resolutions started in 1991. The UN Security Council Resolution 751 mandated the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The UN operation in Somalia aimed to secure the delivery of humanitarian relief but later changed UNOSOM II to the disarmament of militias, reconciliation and re-establishment of the state. According to Debora Valentina Malito from the very beginning, the mission had several disapprovals related to the occasion, legality and modality of intervention. He adds that usually operations were wedged in coordinated problems emerging from the interplay of different interests, aims and strategies (Malito, 2017: 288).

After the state collapsed, civil wars broke out in Somalia. Jonathan Stevenson criticises the UN's response and argues that the UN was not a proactive response to the deteriorating crisis in the country. This is due of that the UN did not clearly understand the depth of the catastrophe until late 1991, long after the famine and clan fighting had become critical (Stevenson, 1993: 8)

U.S. Army Colonel (Retired) Glenn M. Harned notes the first and the most widely complex intervention was engaged by the UN, the U.S. and other allies. It was the first in the record that the U.N. Security Council voted and approved intervention in the internal affairs of an independent UN member state without a formal request from its government this was due to the lack of Somalia's central government and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 751 by enacting UN Charter Chapter Five to establish United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) a Peace-keeping mission entitled to monitor the ceasefire and assist humanitarian relief efforts (Harned, 2016: 12-29).

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA

Resolutions	Task
Resolution 773 (1992)	Arms embargo: "5. <i>Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that</i>

	<p><i>all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise;</i>" (UNSC, 1992: 55)</p>
Resolution 751 (1992)	<p>Establishment of UN mission in Somalia:</p> <p><i>"2. decides to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia;"</i> (UNSC, 1992: 58)</p>
Resolution 775 (1992)	<p>Troops deployment increase:</p> <p><i>"3. Authorizes the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General's report;"</i> (UNSC, 1992: 2)</p>
Resolution 794 (1992)	<p>UNOSOM extension, endorsement of Chapter VII implementation and formation of Unified Command and Control Forces</p> <p><i>"6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of its mandate where conditions permit</i></p> <p><i>7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;</i></p> <p><i>12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above"</i> (UNSC, 1992: 3-4)</p>
Resolution 814 (1993)	<p>The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and authorization of mission expansion.</p> <p><i>"14. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II;"</i> (UNSC, 1993: 5)</p>
Resolution 837	<p>To take necessary measures to disarm, arrest and prosecute armed factions</p> <p><i>"3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of</i></p>

	<p><i>the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;</i></p> <p><i>5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;” (UNSC, 1993: 2)</i></p>
Resolution 954 (1994)	<p>Affirming task of UNOSOM II to facilitate Political Reconciliation and Troops withdrawal</p> <p><i>“2. Affirms that the primary purpose of UNOSOM II until its termination is to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia;</i></p> <p><i>6. Authorizes UNOSOM II military forces to take those actions necessary to protect the UNOSOM II mission and the withdrawal of UNOSOM II personnel and assets, and, to the extent that the Force Commander deems it practicable and consistent, in the context of withdrawal, to protect personnel of relief organizations;” (UNSC, 1994: 3)</i></p>

The mission had an impact on Somalia’s conflict. Dehéz and Gebrewold state that the presence of the UN Peacekeepers Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was heavily influenced by conflicting actors (Dehéz and Gebrewold, 2010: 8). Terrence Lyons adds that the UN presence in Somalia in 1991 and 1992 was manned by a lack of vision and by organisational disputes, elevations of serious doubts about their ability to manage the new tasks drive upon it unless member states transformed the organization. The leaders of armed factions dominated the U.S.-brokered pacts among warlords and the UN-sponsored peace talks these elevated worries that the international actors would get satisfied with a coalition of warlords as the gatekeepers and next generation of Somali leaders (Lyons, 1993: 2).

Chester A. Crocker mentions that the UN expanded the mandate of the mission without providing the means to execute tasks and failed to resolve doubted ways of

disarming Somali factions. In the end, this resulted in the refusal of the United States to lead the task and withdrawal from commanding the post. The UNITAF could have achieved more in demilitarization and disarmament of factional leaders if the United States had been prepared to forecast the outcomes and worked effectively with Somalis (Crocker, 1995: 6).

The mission was largely confronted by the warlords. Jonathan Stevenson has indicated that the warlords doubted the mission's neutrality and were accused of aiding other rivals to gain control of their territories. The US soldiers were not well briefed about Somalis and they did not mind that militias would have an offensive against them (Stevenson, 1993, p. 140). This resulted in the battle of Mogadishu, where 18 US soldiers were killed (an unknown number of Somalis were also killed), the Black Hawk Down news spread out and US President Clinton announced to pull out of US troops from Somalia and the UN Security Council suspended the mission (Recchia, 2020: 359).

1.7. Ethiopian Invasions

After the UN mission concluded without stabilizing Somalia, a new armed wing was also expanded. As Afyare notes religious militancy was neither a challenging factor in the UN and US Peacekeeping mission in 1992-1993 nor played a factor in the original outbreak of civil war (Elmi, 2010: 5). However, after the UN mission withdrawal, Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) gained control of regions and one of their stronghold bases was the Ethiopian bordering region Gedo. In 1996, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and launched military operations against the group by attacking the AIAI stronghold, Gedo (CISAC), 2019). The Ethiopian troops destroyed the base and wiped out AIAI courts, charities and their leadership posts (Maruf and Joseph, 2018: 20-21). The presence of the regional troops complex in Somalia has established this era.

The Ethiopian invasion which had many impacts was given a variety of reasons to elaborate on the Somalia conflict. Debora Valentina Malito argues that the motive of the intervention was a possible alliance between Ethiopia's rebel, Eritrea and Islamist groups in Somalia since Ethiopia and Eritrea were fighting in Badme and Somalia

became subject to their influence. The US Department of State also designated Al-Ittihad Al-Islamaya on the blacklist for suspected connection with Al-Qaeda, the AIAI was operating in the Somali-Galbeed region in Ethiopia¹ (Malito, 2015: 6). The USA's involvement in the Ethiopian Invasion was a key strategic point of Ethiopian motive as Robert G. Patman indicates that the Clinton administration tacitly supported Ethiopian attacks on al-Ittihad (Patman, 2010: 96).

The second Ethiopian Military intervention was against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Baida was weak and hardly able to battle with the IUC, the emergency in the ICU was looming. Katharina M. B. Newbery argues that it was very obvious that Ethiopia engaged in the Somalia conflict both militarily and politically to shape the political atmosphere in Somalia. The Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to uproot the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) The second intervention of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was interpreted to different extents. It was widely understood as a response to an Islamist threat in the context of historical-religious conflict between the two states (Muslim and Christian) so to say that Ethiopia acted by preventing terrorism in the Horn of Africa and continuity of proxy war between the two rival countries (Ethiopian and Eritria) (Newbery, 2021: 255–273).

The invasion was highly controversial due to the destruction and human loss caused by urban warfare. The ICU declared Jihad on Ethiopia and it was a justification for the Ethiopian to stomp these courts in link with AIAI, the Eritrean regime, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). They labelled the ICU as 'fundamentalists, extremist, terrorist, anti-peace, destructive and anti-Ethiopian forces' these accusations were meant to sell that the ICU was not a legitimate actor to shape Somalia and had a direct threat to Ethiopia (Newbery, 2021: 255–273).

The USA publicly supported the second Ethiopian invasion. Nevertheless, it was noted that Americans launched missiles shelling Islamic Union Courts leaders in January 2007 but failed to hit their target and caused civilian casualties. It also indicates that Ethiopians got a reason to claim for the invasion as a superpower

country was also involved with it. The air bombing was one of the reasons for the ICU defeat (Bruton, 2010: 9).

Abdi Ismail Samatar argues that Ethiopia's second invasion was enabled by three factors; first, Ethiopia convinced the US government with false information that ICU was hosting three individuals whom the USA held responsible for the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Salaam in 1998 and designate them to link with Al-Qaeda which the courts declined. Secondly, the Ethiopian's commitment to protecting the Transitional Federal Government which was headed by an ally of Ethiopia and their use of the diplomatic language of protecting internationally legitimate government and lastly, the ICU's failure to establish a functioning administration in the areas felt under their control (Samatar, 2007: 158).

1.8. The Rise And Growth Of Islamist Movements In Somalia (Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, Islamic Union Courts And Al-Shabaab)

The Islamist groups grew with the formation of statehood in Somalia apart from religiously motivated freedom fighters such as the Darvish movement. Ruan van der Walt and Hussein Solomon note that in the 1960s, the *Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami* and the *Jama'at al-Ahl al-Islaami*, both had a link with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt pursued to apply Islamic principles for the newly founded Somalia state and 1980s small circle of this Islamist was operating in Mogadishu (der Walt and Solomon, 2014, p. 85). In the civil war, several Islamist factions were elevated, these organizations include Al Islah, Al Tabliq, Al Takfir and Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAD). (Shay, 2008: 4-8)

1.8.1. Al Ittihad Al Islamiya

The Al Ittihad Al Islamiya came after the union of the Unity of Islamic Youth (Wahdat al Shabaab al Islamiyya) and the Islamic Group (al Jama'a al Islamiyya). These two organizations merged in 1982 with a new umbrella of the Islamic Union (Shinn, 2011: 204).

The increase of Islamist movement in Somalia was forthcoming, and late 1990s Al-Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) joined conflicting actors in Somalia. The organization sought to establish an Islamic state in Somalia that observes Wahabism interpretations similar to Taleban in Afghanistan. Al Ittihad has not been able to organize enough forces and sustained temporary political gain, but unconfirmed assertions connected the AIAI to the killing of 18 US soldiers in the battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) in the 1993 UNOSOM intervention and had logistically backed the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 while Ethiopia also accused AIA direct of links with Osama bin Laden of Al-Qaeda (Sage, 2001: 472-477).

The AI Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIA) progressed militarily and conflicted with two prominent faction leaders, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aided in Kismayo and Col. Abdillahi Yusuf in the Bari region, although AIAI lost both wars, the organization moved their base to Gedo, a very strategic region bordering with Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia believed that the new base of AIAI was the springboard of attacks on its territory and conducted military action against AIAI in 1996 and destroyed them (Barnes and Hassan, 2007: 3-4).

The organization fragmented into originated groups. Ronald Marchal notes that the leader of the organization, Sheikh Ali Warsame who was the commanding leader of the AIAI after the leader was slain in Bosaso stepped down and returned to Bur'oto to lead Whadat Al-Shabaab, one of the groups who united with AIAI in 1993. Marchal also adds that clan allegiance affected the organization and split it into at least three micro-organizations. A group operating in the Ogaden region, another one based in the Gedo region and al-I'tisam Kitab wal Sunna (Marchal, 2009).

The relevance of the AIAI in the Somalia conflict is that the organization was the first armed Islamist organization in Somalia and participated in the armed clash in the country. Additionally, as in the Ethiopian invasion section, Al Ittihad was the justification reason for the troops in Somalia. Therefore, it has a position in the country's conflict.

1.8.2. Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

The term Islamic Courts was first recorded in the north of Mogadishu in a time the chaos and insecurity were in higher pike 1994. The courts successfully dealt with criminality but a challenge emerged when a prominent Sheikh Ali Dhere contravened President Ali Mahdi, who issued a decree to disband the courts. This had setbacks for the courts, however, in 1998 the Islamic courts were established in the south of Mogadishu after the death of Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid. The courts in the south of Mogadishu were influenced by political Islam via figures of Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIA) who made hideouts in Mogadishu after their dismantlement. The courts emerged and united in Islamic Union Courts and elected school teacher Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the chairman and their influence grew higher (Barnes and Hassan, 2007: 3-4).

The Islamic Courts Union defeated powerful warlords and provided a sort of security in their ruled areas. The courts originated from clan courts and can be described as a heterogeneous administration. These courts were first founded in the north of Mogadishu and their governance system is based on religious traditions with political perceptions. The structure of the ICU had three levels, Shura (Council), chairmanship and military leader. The Shura had clan members from political, traditional, businessmen and religious leaders. The chairmanship used to be elected by the Shura, while the chair would appoint a military commander with the approval of the Shura (council) (Mwangi, 2010: 89).

During their period, ICU succeeded enforcement of law and order in Mogadishu, re-opened Mogadishu's seaport and international airport, and won widespread supporters. This concaved the eyes of the US government to attempt to break negotiations between the courts and the Transitional Federal Government to achieve a power-sharing government. However, conflicting interests emerged within the ICU circle, these conflicting struggles were included by a jihadist militia Al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2009: 225).

The ICU has an important role in the history of Somalia's conflict. The Courts were the first non-other warlords to operate in Mogadishu and defeated the warlords. This

organization was the only one that powerful warlords regrouped to fight in late 2005 (www.bbc.com, 2005) and the offspring of the Al-Shabaab after the Ethiopians invaded Mogadishu and destroyed the ICU.

1.8.3. Al Shabab

Earlier in 2007, the Islamic Union courts were overpowered by the military of the Ethiopian troops and TFG, nonetheless, a prominent threat emerged on the edges of Union Courts. Al-Shabaab, also known as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin developed as the organization splintered into smaller factions. The new organization became the most visible offshoot, intent on ostensibly establishing a regional theocracy and within years affiliated with Al-Qaeda as late leaders of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly announced their allegiance (Cannon and Pkalya, 2019: 839)

An influential Islamic Courts Union member Hassan Dahir Aweys appointed one of his deputies Adan Hashi Ayro as the commander of the ICU training base in Mogadishu, Mu'askar Mahkamad (Troops of the Islamic Courts) which was later renamed the Jamaa'a al-Shabaab. The new commander, Ayro brought the base to his friends who fought in Afghanistan (Maruf and Joseph, 2018: 46).

It is undeniable that the Ethiopian invasion of the capital city played a role in the radicalization of Somali society. The move supported groups such as al-Shabab to be introduced and the invasion product brought many factors, the occupation of Somali territory by Ethiopian troops from 2006 to 2009, the wish for stability and security, and the failure to establish a legitimate and authoritative government (Webersik, 2014).

The newly formed Al-Shabaab spread rapidly and gained existing momentum. The organization posed a threat to not only the weak Transitional Federal Government but also to civilians, thus, it resulted in alarming globally. In 2008, Al-Shabaab was designated and enlisted as a global terrorist organization by the US government. It was a recognition of how dangerous Al-Shabaab was and thus became a global agenda (Centre, 2023).

Al-Shabaab terrorizes the public, assassinates and bombs government officials and attacks government and foreign (embassies, bases) buildings. According to Global Terrorism Index 2022, Al-Shabaab killed more than six thousand since 2007 (Institute for Economics & Peace , 2022, p. 22). However, the worst and deadliest attack that Al-Shabaab committed happened on 14th October 2017. The attack also known as the ‘Soobe explosion’ killed almost 600 hundred and wounded more than a thousand citizens (Kahiye, 2021).

The organization not only bombed Somalia but also neighbouring countries, Kenya is among the victims of Al-Shabaab attacks. Al-Shabaab 3 days siege at Westgate Mall Nairobi in Kenya and the Garissa University attack killed 67 and 150 people respectively (Torbjörnsson, 2017, p. 1). Uganda witnessed a barbaric attack of Al-Shabaab in 2010 whereby 74 individuals watching the World Cup were killed in Kampala (www.aljazeera.com, 2010).

Al-Shabaab has a critical role in the conflict in Somalia and it has been an important actor in Somalia since its rise in the ashes of the ICU. This organization is a radical organization and operates beyond the borders of Somalia. This organization shaped the conflict in Somalia into an extremist and Jihadist group as the U.S. designated it global terror. After Al-Shabaab’s threat spread through the country and hazarded the weak transitional federal government, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) waded to deploy troops to Somalia but failed thus the African Union (AU) embarked on the creation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The next chapter will deeply study this mission on a variety of dimensions.

1.9. Conclusion

The conflict in Somalia is multiple-layered and involves different actors such as Warlords, Islamist groups such as Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah and Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and terrorist wings i.e. Al-Shabaab. These groups participated in the armed conflict in Somalia and played a significant role in the instability. The definite scenarios of the conflict include power struggles, clan dynamics, terrorism and foreign interventions including neighbouring countries' direct involvement i.e.

Ethiopian invasions. The conflict involved armed clan militias and armed terrorists. The issue of power struggle started with the birth of the republic in the 1960s. On the other hand, inter-clan conflicts used to be solved through widely accepted Xeer.

Looking at the chronology of the contemporary of Somalia's conflicts, the country had several military coup attempts. However, 1969's military coup led by Gen. Siyad Barre was the only successfully steered coup and reshaped Somalia into a tyrannical pro-Soviet ally and single-party state. This regime had a very tight ruling system and the junta arrested statesmen, including the first president of the republic politicians and all actors seemed opponents to the military rule.

The sense of Greater Somali was among nationalist notions of statehood. This led Ethiopian-Somalia war in the Ogaden region in 1977 and with the help of the Soviet Union, Cuba and Yemen, Ethiopia defeated Somalia. This event turned the situation of Somalia into volatile. Two countries started arming factions, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SN) and the United Somali Congress (USC) rose. Thereafter, Somali armed factions by force ousted Gen. Siyad Barre from office and the country fell into civil war and chaos.

The first time and perhaps last time, the UN Security Council enacted Chapter I Five to approve the deployment of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNISOM) in 1993-1994 which had changed from humanitarian operations to peace-making operations notably (UNISOM I, UNISOM II and UNITAF). The mission was concluded once the US conflicted with Gen. Mohamed Farah Aided in what is known 'Battle of Mogadishu' or 'Black Hawk Down' whereby 18 US Marine corps were killed and dragged into streets of Mogadishu and the US withdrew from its forces from Somalia. However, the conflict in Somalia continued and worsened.

The emergence of Islamist organizations was chronic as students educated from Egypt and Saudi Arabia carrying Salafism ideology were returning to Somalia and seeking space to gain influence. Subsequently, the state collapse was a golden opportunity for them. The Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) was the first armed Islamist militia to gain control of regions. The AIAI has defeated triplet bouts from Col.

Abdillahi Yusuf in the Barri region, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid in Kismayo and Ethiopian troops invasion in the Gedo region in 1996.

A reconciliation conference was held for Somalia and the most productive conference was in the 2000, Arta Djibouti Conference. In this conference, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed but did not make significant progress due to challenges from the powerful warlords in Mogadishu. Another Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in Kenya in 2004. This government relocated to Jowhar and then Badio before it moved to Mogadishu but the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) posed a hazard threat and thus resulted in an invasion from Ethiopia in 2006. Once again in Djibouti, the former leader of the ICU was elected as the president after President Yusuf resigned in 2009.

The Ethiopian government with the help of the US government thrived to sell the preeminent extremism of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and used it as justification to invade Somalia again in 2006. The disarmament of the ICU flashed and paved the way for Al-Shabaab. This new organisation is so far in the history of Somalia the deadliest and most extremist organization in Somalia and brought tension to the African Union for the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) after it became an emerging danger to the government of President Yusuf.

Contemporary Somalia's conflict showed that the situation was getting hostile. The attempts did not bring full stabilization in the country as Somalia remains fragile and lacks a strong government. It further points out that the armed Islamists have been endangering the stabilization efforts since 1996. To additionally connect the matter to AMISOM, it is necessary to remember that AMISOM came in the course of these armed terrorist Al-Shabaab. Therefore, the longest and most comprehensive effort was the AMISOM mission which active since 2007. The fifteen years of presence, AMISOM had achievements and challenges, thus the next chapters will further examine these issues.

CHAPTER TWO

AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

This chapter presents the details of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It aims to present what the mission was tasked and asked to deliver, this would let the study point out the factors that challenged the mission and hardened to deliver these duties fully. It starts with the foundation of AMISOM. The foundation stages started with the invitation of the late Somalia president to deployment of the AU troops to Somalia, the failed attempts of the East African regional bloc to establish the IGASOM and the return role of the AU to lead the mission will also be looked at in this chapter.

The mandates of AMISOM from their AU beginning tasks to the Security Council Resolutions such as 1477 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2073 (2012), 2182 (2014), 2297 (2016), 2372 (2017) 2472 (2019) and 2628 (2022) ON ATMIS will be addressed in details. The aim of presenting AMISOM mandates is to give a clear understanding of the tasks, duties and strategic objectives that the mission is assigned to accomplish. However, whether AMISOM achieved these tasks and the challenges it encountered will be discussed next chapter. The significance of these UN Security Council Resolutions is to understand the benchmark work of the mission and it would lead to highlighting the challenges that the mission faced to carry out these tasks.

This part also presents the list of the troops contributing countries (TCCs) and the number of troops that contributed to the mission and sectors that the mission stationed in Southern Somalia while the organizational structure from the appointed Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) who was also the head of the mission, Chief of Staff, Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), Chief Administrative Services (CAS), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Integrated

Support Services (ISS), Mission Analysis Cell (MAC), Mission Operation Centre (MOC), Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC) will be added. The amount of funds that the European Union (EU) financed to AMISOM and the logistical support of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) are included in the enlightened points in this chapter.

2.1. Foundation Of AMISOM

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in Kenya in 2004, however, it could not be installed in Mogadishu due to the deprived security situation. In the fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU meeting held at Abuja in January 2005, the IGAD Heads of State and Government (IHSG) reviewed the security situation in Somalia. The meetings decided to provide and empower the newly established TFG to relocate back to Somalia. These efforts resulted in the proposal of the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGADSOM) (Kasaija, 2010: 226).

The TFG was relocated to Somalia in mid-2005 without external actor support and was temporarily stationed in Jawhar, and then Baido cities as the government could not immediately move to Mogadishu, the capital city due to the presence of warlords. The Islamic Union Courts (ICU) were evolving as they defeated the hook umbrella of the warlords backed by the US for posing a counterterrorism coalition, Alliance for the Restoration Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was controlling large areas in the south-central of Somalia. There were failed negotiations to stop the ICU expansion as the ICU declared war to capture Baido, the hosting TFG city. However, the Ethiopian troops' invasion and TFG forces overpowered the active presence of the ICU and were defeated (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 36).

Al-Shabaab rose in the ashes of the ICU defeat. The enlargement of Al-Shabaab endangered the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The government of Somalia has confronted an existential hazard posed by these radical Islamist militias. The threat was mainly posed by Al-Shabaab as the organization got public impetus

and for the resistance to Ethiopian troop's second invasion of Somalia from 2006 to 2009 (Anderson, 2014: 938).

The late president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed visited Addis Ababa and asked the African Union to deploy 20,000 troops and help the establishment of his authority in the war-torn country. However, as stated above, the East African regional bloc IGAD agreed to authorize the arrangement of the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). Although President Yusuf's plan to invite external forces had repercussions in the country, the mission was not advanced beyond papers and failed to establish a functional operation in Somalia (Healy, 2008).

The AU mission established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which could be explained to be one of the largest and perhaps the most comprehensive missions that the AU conducted in its history. The Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu & Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede's article titled as (AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace Missions) described AMISOM as a mission of an atypical peace-supporting operation (PSO) intended and evolved as sui generis and continues to chart its political and military course (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017: 199).

The African Union (AU), a governing body of the continent pledged the formation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The new mission, AMISOM replaced the previously proposed mission IGASOM which the IGAD organization proposed and approved by the African Union. A communique released by Peace and Security Council 69th Meeting on 19 January 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia stated that the AU decided to authorize the mission in a period of six months mandate. The given mandate of AMISOM in those six months included providing support to the Somalia government for the stabilization of the country and the maintenance of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and generating conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia (www.au.int, 2007).

On 6th March 2007, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union (AU) signed a status of mission agreement (SOMA) on the newly formed African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for Somalia's side signed by the ambassador of Somalia to Ethiopia and the AU Amb. Abdikarim Farah while the AU side was signed by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. The agreement chapter focused on general provisions of the mission, mandates, status of AMISOM, recruitment of local personnel, currency, the status of mission members, limitations of mission's liability, settlements of disputes, supplemental arrangements, liaison and miscellaneous provisions (www.amisom-au.org, 2023).

The AMISOM mission's official site states that AMISOM was "an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations". The mission also shares the background of AMISOM with the above-stated literature. AMISOM replaced the IGAD proposed mission IGASOM approved by both the AU and the UN Security Council which was intended to work on development protection and training missions in Somalia. The AMISOM states that the initially proposed mission IGASOM to implement the delivery of peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War in March 2005. Once IGASOM was mandated, the ICU did not take control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). AMISOM also mentioned that there was opposition from the ICU on IGASOM due to the belief that the proposed mission was a Western means to restrict the development of the ICU. On 20th February 2007, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 1744 allowing the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a period of six months mandate. The newly authorized peacekeeping mission aimed to support a national reconciliation congress and demanded a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations peacekeeping mission (www.amisom-au.org, 2023).

The first task of AMISOM in the period of the mission's six-month mandate included seven pillars. These points included:

1. AMISOM should support dialogue with conflicting actors and play a role in the reconciliation in Somalia by working with all stakeholders.

2. AMISOM would provide protection for the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions.
3. AMISOM should assist Somalia in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP).
4. The mission should provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.
5. The mission monitors the security situation in areas of operation.
6. Facilitation of humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
7. Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence (www.amisom-au.org, 2023)

The established mandate of the mission by the AU highlights that the organization was ordering the protection of the government since Al-Shabaab was endangering the weak TFG. The AU's mandate to AMISOM emphasised the advancement of reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia with further support for the disarmament of the armed groups and stabilization and provision of humanitarian assistance corridors.

2.2. Troops Contributing Countries

The AMISOM contingents contain troops from six countries. The deployment of the AMISOM started in 2007 as Uganda was the first country to vow the deployment followed by Burundi. The frontline countries Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia joined in 2011, 2012 and 2014 respectively while Sierra Leone joined in 2013.

Table 2. AMISOM troops Contributing Countries

Country	Joined AMISOM
Uganda	2007
Burundi	2007
Djibouti	2011
Kenya	2012
Sierra Leone	2013
Ethiopia	2014

(est. maximum)

Source: *Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)* report by: (Paul D. Williams et al, 2018, p. 56)

The six troops contributing countries deployed 21,564 personnel to the AMISOM mission. This personnel consists of military operations and includes police operations an additional 562 personnel. Uganda which is the highest contributor had 6,223 personnel on the ground, which comprises 29% of AMISOM’s total military troops. Burundi which is the second highest contributor had 5,432, which covers 25%. Somalia's neighbouring countries also sent troops to the AMISOM mission, Ethiopia's troops on the ground were 4,395, this equivalent to 20%, Kenya's troops to AMISOM were 3,664 (17%), while Djibouti had 1,000 (5%), and Sierra Leone 850 (4%) (Hesse, 2015: 330).

2.3. AMISOM/ATMIS Funding

It is necessary to outline the funding sources of the mission since it involves the AU, UN and the EU. AMISOM is mainly funded by two organizations which provide both financial and logistical support. These two bodies were the UN, and the European Union (EU). According to the EU, the body funded € 2.3 billion to AMISOM since 2007 and is the largest direct contributor to the mission. The European Peace Facility (EPF) pledged to continue supporting the new mission ATMIS for €120 million in 2022 (www.consilium.europa.eu, 2022).

Donors not only provide financial aid to AMISOM but also to other facilitates needed on the ground. The UN had an AMISOM mission support office on the ground. The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) also known as UNSOS for AMISOM (UNSOA) was founded in the UN Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) for delivering logistics to AMISOM. Once the AMISOM mission was changed to a transition mission, the UNSOS office was tasked to continue providing logistics support to ATMIS (www.unsos.unmissions.org, 2023).

2.4. AMISOM Sectors

Table 3. AMISOM Sector divisions

Sector	Stationed	Contingent
Sector 1	Based in the Lower Shabelle region	Ugandan
Sector 2	Based in Dhobley	Kenyan

Sector 3	Based in the Bay and Bakol regions	Ethiopian
Sector 4	Based in the Hiran region	Djiboutian
Sector 5	Based in the Middle Shabelle region	Burundian
Sector Kismayo	A multiple forces station in Kismayo and commanded by Sierra Leonean troops	Sierra Leone, Burundi, Kenyan

The above figure maps the AMISOM stations in Southern Somalia as AMISOM presented on its official website. However, the Mogadishu station (headquarters) is not included (AMISOM, 2014).

The AMISOM sectors demonstrate that each country was stationed separately. However, sector Kismayo was the only sector that had more than one troop stationed. It further shows that Ethiopian troops were manned to two regions while other troops were stationed in one region each. In addition, the Kenya and Ethiopian troops were in their bordering region.

Contrary to the above figure, the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute presents a different dimension to the AMISOM stations. The below table summarizes the sectors as presented by the institute:

Table 4. AMISOM Sectors

Country	Sectors
Uganda	The Ugandan troops to AMISOM are based in Sector 1 which is three regions (Mogadishu, Middle and Lower Shabelle)
Burundi	The Burundi troops to AMISOM are stationed in Baidoa, the Burundian troops operate in Sector 3, the area of the Bay and Bakool regions but also preserves troops in Sector 1 in close work with the Ugandan forces.
Ethiopia	The Ethiopia troops to AMISOM are located in Sector 3.
Kenya	The Kenyan troops to AMISOM are positioned in Sector 2, (headquartered in the port city of Kismayo), and extended to Lower and Middle Juba regions.
Djibouti	The Djiboutian troops to AMISOM are grounded in the Beletweyne Hiiran region and serve as Sector 4 headquarters.
(Garcia, 2020)	

The AMISOM mission notes that it had three components (military, police and civilian) and of all of these components, the military was the biggest. This sector was mandated to conduct peace-supporting missions and pursue to stabilization of Somalia. As will also be stated in the mandates section, the military component of AMISOM was working on creating the necessary environments for performing humanitarian activities and an ultimate handover of the Mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. This sector was also assigned to protect Somalia's federal institutions to work on their functions and to aid the security of Somalia's key infrastructure including its airports and seaports. The late military component of AMISOM was contributed by Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. These forces were stationed as Ugandans at Sector 1 (Banadir, and Lower Shabelle regions). Kenyans at Sector 2 (Lower and Middle Jubba). Sector 3 was stationed by Ethiopians in (Bay and Bakool regions and Gedo region as Sub Sector 3). The Djiboutians were in place of Sector 4 (Hiiraan and Galgaduud) while Burundians were responsible for Sector 5 (Middle Shabelle region) (www.amisom-au.org, 2023).

2.5. AMISOM Organizational Structure

The below chart shows the structural framework of the missions. The chart displays the established line of missions' coordinations and the main chain command that shapes the delegations of the mission's tasks. It starts with the head of the missions, the Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) who was also the head of the mission and mainly appointed ambassador used to take this role and lead the work on the ground. The Police and Forces commanders commanded the sectors with The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) directly attached to the office of SRCC.

The deputy of SRCC shares the line with these offices but separately manages the Protection, Human Rights and Gender, Integrated Mission Training Centre, Humanitarian Liaison, Public Information, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs. However, Safety, Legal and Conduct Units work separately.


The Chief of Staff lies next to the SRCC and delegates the duties to (MAC), Mission Operation Centre (MOC), and Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC)

offices. Support Services (ISS) and the Chief Administrative Services (CAS) worked under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) which was administrated by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

The chart further describes the mission's top leadership position as civilian posts such as the ambassador who was the leader of the mission and special representative of the AU to Somalia. Additionally, the mission had a Maritime section that secured the coastlines of the areas where the mission was stationed.



The Chart: AMISOM Organizational Structure



2.6. The Security Council Resolutions About AMISOM

This section focuses only on the UN Security Council resolutions on AMISOM mandates, tasks, priorities and strategic objectives. However, it is necessary to note that there are many UN Security Council resolutions available on the official website of AMISOM covering embargos, the situation in Somalia and other issues but for the limitations of this study, only resolutions that concern AMISOM mission will be used as a primary source to describe the tasks and mandates of AMISOM.

The AU establishment of the AMISOM was followed by the UN Security Council's involvement and approval. The mission was brought under the UN Security Council as a new resolution was extended to the outreach of the AMISOM mandates and tasks under the United Nations. Resolution 1744 (2007) was given details on Africa's Peace and Security Council.

The Security Council Resolution stated below points:

The council flow-suit the mandate period with the AU mandate as the council adopted and authorized the AU to establish for a period of six months for AMISOM in Somalia. The establishment was included to take all necessary measures for the fulfilment of the following mandates. The article four of The Security Council Resolution stated in the following points

- (a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the process referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3;
- (b) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;
- (c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces;

(d) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel; .

(UNSC, 2007: 2-3)

The first point of this task seems the mission to protect both the government and UN staff. Protection of key institutes was the critical duty for the mission as Al-Shabaab was posing a danger to the government. It seems that the cause of the mission's establishment was this point and thus aim was the protection of the weak TFG and its functioning places. The reflection of this mandates shows that the Council realized the weakness and ineffectiveness of the local forces therefore, the mission hereby dutied to support the government for the re-strength of its local forces. Adding the provision of a humanitarian corridor seems that it is been realized the ground problem in humanitarian delivery. The previous UNOSOM mandate also aimed to provide safe routes for humanitarian assistance and it seems that since there were armed militias in the country, humanitarian delivery was an issue. The last mandate indicates that the council had in mind the violent environment that the troops deployed to and therefore, prioritized the protection of the mission's personnel.

These five tasks in this mandate were the founding guideline of the mission and it seemed to have covered the main necessities in Somalia during the deployment period as the conflict continued, thus pursuing reconciliation was rightly needed. The protection of the government was highly desired as the previous TNG government did not operate due to the armed militias while Al-Shabaab was speedily emerging and gaining momentum as discussed in the first chapter. The case of safe routes for humanitarian corridors was an issue for two decades. Therefore, adding the mission-assigned tasks made the complexity of the aims and target of AMISOM that it was not only a security concerned mission nonetheless also a humanitarian mission. This mandate looks to have answered the points stated by Healy that TFG president Abdullahi Yusuf asked for support for the deployment of 20,000 troops that would help the government establish his authority in Somalia (Healy, 2008)

Comparing the two resolutions, the six-month mandate of the Africa Peace and Security Council tasks AMISOM which the mission establishment was given and the UN Security Council's first assigned mandates. The AU's mandate was concise, proud and generalized the duties while the Security Council's mandate was detailed and expanded the task. Therefore, the UN's mandate seems sufficient guidelines and clear. On the other hand, the principle points of both organizations seem the same what would slightly make the difference is the clarity of the UN Security Council.

The political landscape of the country changed in 2008, as President Abdullahi Yusuf who invited AMISOM to Somalia resigned after rifting with his Prime Minister (Ahmed, 2008). Thus, the third Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in Djibouti. This time, the new president was a moderate Islamist, former chairman of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the union that clashed with the TFG and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The president was the leading chair of the Courts wing who had a negotiation with the Transitional Federal Government (www.bbc.com, 2009). In addition to that, Djibouti was not an AMISOM troop-contributing country at this time as it joined in 2011, therefore, the tasked reconciliation support seems much greater than the ability of AMISOM at this stage.

2.6.1. Security Council Resolutions 2010 (2011) And 2182 (2014)

Since the first UN Security Council resolution, AMISOM mandates have been renewed from time to time. For these mandate extensions, there are two resolutions that the UN Security Council extended the AMISOM mandate period without removing or adding new tasks, objectives or priorities. The Council Resolution 2010 and 2182 issued in the years 2011 and 2014 respectively extended the AMISOM mandate period as the Security Council authorized that AMISOM should maintain deployment till 31st October 2012 and take all necessary measures of the previous mandate. In addition to that, the council requested the African Union to increase the forces to 12,000 uniformed personnel to carry out their mandates (UNSC, 2011: 3-4). On 24 October 2014, the AMISOM presence in Somalia and endurance of troops deployment was extended. The Council authorized that AU members should continue troops deployment to AMISOM mission in Somalia as noted in paragraph 1

of the Council's resolution 2093 (2013) until 30 November 2015, The Council requested the AU to maximise AMISOM troops to 22,126 troops level and approved to take all necessary procedures and to execute its mandate in full compliance with its Member States' commitments to under the agreed human rights commandments and international humanitarian, and full respect of Somalia's unity, sovereignty, and political independence (UNSC, 2014: 8)

As a result, in comparison to these aforesaid two resolutions **2010 (2011) and 2182 (2014)**, it turns out that the UN desired the achievement of the target troop numbers and the maintenance of new troops' deployment. Achieving the maximum-level troops was critical for the strength of mission operation and making significant progress for the ahead duties. This is the period that most AMISOM operations such as the liberation of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu were carried out and therefore, reaching the maximum troop level seems vital for the continuity of the mission's operation. The AU Peace and Security Council and AMISOM leadership also had a meeting in Nairobi to discuss the Mission Impilimation Plan (MIP), this meeting was focused on identifying the areas that needed MIP and the leadership expected to agree on an achievable plan (www.amisom-au.org, 2010). However, the meeting did not mention the need to achieve a maximum troop level.

2.6.2. The UN Security Council Resolution 2073 (2012)

In November 2012, the council again extended the mandates of AMISOM. The Resolution 2073 (2012) under the use of UN Chapter five gave AMISOM new mandates which are stated as the Council authorised the continuity of AMISOM troop deployment until 7th March 2013, the mission was approved for taking all essential actions, in obedience appropriately to both human rights law and international humanitarian, and full admiration of the unity, sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Somalia. The mandate outlines AMISOM to carry out the following tasks.

- (a) To maintain a presence in the four sectors set out in the AMISOM Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012, and in those sectors, in coordination with the SNSF, reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed

opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia;

(b) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia;

(c) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;

(d) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive SNSF;

(e) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(f) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council (UNSC, 2012: 1-2)

This resolution shares the duties with the previous mandates such as support of reconciliation in the country, protection of the government, humanitarian security and the SNSF program. However, at the time of this mandate, AMISOM drove out Al-Shabaab from the capital and operations were progressing in the other regions. Since AMISOM was sectorized into several stations, the mandate tasked the mission to maintain the presence of these areas following AMISOM's strategic concept and it was a new assignment for the mission. It seems the council expected AMISOM to spread its duties not only these ongoing but also other necessary assignments to stabilize the country and prepare the ability of local forces to take a role in security.

2.6.3. The UN Security Council Resolution 2297 (2016)

The AMISOM's mission and directive were remodified once again by the Security Council and were given new priorities and tasks. The AU was asked again to achieve the AMISOM troops deployment target up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017 and further, the council adopted that AMISOM should take all necessary measures to deliver its mandate. In these new directives, the AMISOM mission was also given new strategic objectives as stated below:

- (a) Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
- (b) Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia;
- (c) Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces; (UNSC, 2016: 3)

In addition to these key strategic objectives, AMISOM was given and renewed its prior task as below.

- (a) To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
- (b) To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces;
- (c) To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement;
- (d) To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU; (UNSC, 2016: 3-4)

In this resolution, AMISOM was also authorized to carry out the essential task below:

- (a) To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS;
- (b) To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- (c) To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilisation by the United Nations Country Team and other actors;
- (d) To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;
- (e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;
- (f) To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations (UNSC, 2016: 4).

This mandate was the largest and most complex that AMISOM received since its establishment. It appears that this resolution is heavier than the previous mandates. It was the first time that the country directly tasked AMISOM to carry out operations against Al-Shabaab. Reduction of the threat of Al-Shabaab was emphasised in this mandate and it indicates that the council had prioritized the importance of making Al-Shabaab ineffective to the state building in Somalia, at the same time, the council generates the importance of joint operations that both AMISOM and Somalia's security forces conduct. In the previous mandates, the council was tasked with the mission to support Somalia for the training of local forces in the Somali National

Security Forces (SNSF), however, in this period, the council was tasked with having joint operations between the two and it seems that the local forces strength reached a level that could share duties with AMISOM.

The council greenlight of the gradual handover of security responsibilities makes sense that the local forces had the strength to handle their role. The council also recognised the importance of local people's engagements and asked AMISOM to integrate with the public. Starting the preparation of the gradual handover of security responsibilities shows the mission's departure line was established. (For the full text of the Resolution, See Appendix 1)

2.6.4. The UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017)

Resolution 2372 issued by the council ratified a reduction of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel and a decrease of AMISOM troops to 20,626 by the 30 of October 2018. The council also decided to accelerate the pace of the reduction in consideration of the capabilities of Somali forces in the handling of the country's security. This was the first time that the AMISOM mission was tasked to reduce its troops. The mission was permitted to pursue the following strategic objectives:

- (a) Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;
- (b) Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
- (c) Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia; (UNSC, 2017: 3)

In the above resolution 2372, the council asked AMISOM to continue the fulfilment of previous tasks and to assist Somalia's security forces in executing their duties and efforts for reconciliations, peacebuilding and security. Protection of the mission personnel and other United Nations personnel. The mission was assigned to secure humanitarian supply routines including areas recovered from Al-Shabaab and AMISOM logistical support. The mission was remanded to conduct joint operations

with the Somali Security Forces to target an offensive against Al-Shabaab. In close collaboration with, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSAM), AMISOM was tasked to mentor Somali Security Forces both police and military in line with National Security Architecture. AMISOM was also given the green light to receive defectors in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia (UNSC, 2017: 2-4).

This resolution shares duties with resolution 2297 (2016), nonetheless, the reduction of the troops seems new to this resolution. At this stage, AMISOM was required to assist the Somali Security Forces and reduce its troops. The significance of this task was to prepare the local leadership for the operations and to examine their sustainability of making improvements. It designates the ambition to put security responsibilities to local forces and to waive the head AMISOM of being caretaking, thus the mission reduces its forces and prepares for departure. Looking for the news, the drawdown seems not achieved for this mandate's period.

2.6.5. The UN Security Council Resolution 2472 (2019)

The mission was green-lighted to maintain a presence until 31 May 2020, minimize its police to 1,040 and diminish AMISOM troops by 1000 as the troop number would be halted to 19,626 personnel.¹ AMISOM was tasked to work on a Transition Plan by handing over the security to Somali Forces. The ability of Somalia to generate, accountable, acceptable and affordable forces, as well as joint AU/UN/FGS threat assessments of the conditions on the ground, in coordination with relevant partners.

The AMISOM mission was dispersed to pursue strategic objectives in the context of the Transition Plan, a plan set to hand over the security responsibilities to Somali authorities as stated in previous resolutions. The assignment was emphasized to facilitate a gradual handover to give leadership to Somali institutions in 2021, reduce Al-Shabab threats and assist Somali security forces provision of security in all aspects.

The council also decided and authorized AMISOM to carry out further priorities so the mission could achieve tasks to achieve these objectives. The newly adopted

strategies were the last mandate of AMISOM to fulfil before it was officially ended and tasked with a transitional mission in 2022.

The last strategic objectives that AMISOM was given were stated below:

- (a) Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in AMISOM's Concept of Operations, prioritising the main population centres, and reconfiguring within the timeline and guidelines of this resolution;
- (b) Mentor and assist Somali security forces, including combat readiness mentoring for Somali military forces, and mentoring and training where necessary for Somali police;
- (c) Secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabab, in coordination with stabilisation and reconciliation actors, in particular, supply routes essential to improving the humanitarian situation, which may include commercial goods essential to meeting the basic needs of civilians, those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, and key supply routes supporting delivery of the Transition Plan, and underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;
- (d) Assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to enable the Somali authorities to carry out their functions of government, including their efforts towards, stabilisation coordinated with the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR) and Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A), reconciliation, peacebuilding, election preparation and security for key infrastructure;
- (e) Conduct targeted offensive operations that support the Transition Plan, including jointly with the Somali security forces, to disrupt and degrade Al Shabab and other armed opposition groups, and take actions to mitigate the threat posed by improvised explosive devices;
- (f) Reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in support of the Transition Plan and in favour of police personnel within the authorised AMISOM personnel ceiling;
- (g) Protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its

personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;

(h) Receive defectors on a transitory basis, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the FGS;

(i) Support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and the documentation and facilitation of the inspection of seized equipment as requested in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013) and paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014); (UNSC, 2019: 3-4).

The new thing in this resolution was that the Somali Transition Plan (STP) came on course. This was a plan in which the actors agreed gradual handover of security of the country to Somali forces. AMISOM's role was limited to supporting SNA in the operations and training Somali Police if needed. Looking deeply at this mandate and the previous two mandates it comes out that the role of AMISOM was being concisely diminished and role-giving for the local forces was getting increased. The issue of the charcoal export ban which was embargoed in resolution 2111 (2013) was mentioned in this mandate and asked AMISOM to support both FGS and FMS in the implementation of this ban.

To understand the STP plan, the Somali Transition Plan was “a comprehensive guide developed by the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners to the transfer of security responsibility to Somali National Security Forces ahead of AMISOM's anticipated exit in 2021” (AMISOM, 2019). This plan seems that both parties agreed to the accomplishment of the STP before the exit of the mission in 2021.

2.6.6. The UN Security Council Resolution 2628 (2022) On ATMIS

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was concluded and reconfigured into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in a period of 12 months mandate to carry out the previous mandate of AMISOM in Al-Shabab threat reduction, supporting Somali Security, working in phases to hand over security responsibilities and provision of peace and reconciliation with Somalia Transition Plan and National Security Architecture.

The new Transitional mission, ATMIS was authorized to follow strategic objectives to achieve its mandate effectively and work on progressing the transitional period in the advancement mission's target plan. The new strategic objectives outlined a joint proposal for both ATMIS and Somalia Security Forces as below:

- (a) conducting jointly planned and targeted operations with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL;
- (b) support Somali security forces by jointly holding priority population centres and providing protection for the local communities, United Nations personnel and installations, securing main supply routes identified by the FGS, and coordinating with stabilisation and reconciliation actors in collaboration with Somali security forces, to support the implementation of the Somali National Stabilisation Strategy and State Stabilisation Plans;
- (c) assisting the FGS in the implementation of stabilisation efforts for all recovered areas in coordination with Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A) and other stabilisation actors;
- (d) supporting the capacity development of the Somali security forces with priority given to force generation, operational competencies and logistical support capabilities to facilitate the progressive takeover of security responsibilities in Somalia;
- (e) supporting Somali security forces across the clear, hold and build phases, in line with the STP, and collaboration with federal government institutions by facilitating humanitarian liaison, and community engagement as well as assisting Somali security forces with complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and holding accountable those responsible for violations thereof (UNSC, 2022: 7-8)

The council also authorised ATMIS' military, police and civilian components to conduct the tasks outlined in paragraphs 33 to 39 of the Joint Proposal, and recollected the CONOPs (Concept of Operations) provide the following tasks:

- (a) conduct joint simultaneous targeted offensive operations across all sectors, in coordination with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL;
- (b) support Somali security forces in providing security for the political process at all levels, including stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding;
- (c) configure ATMIS in terms of composition, structure, disposition and equipment, to best support the handover of security responsibility to Somali security forces;
- (d) support Somali security forces in clearing main supply routes, including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab; provide combat mentorship to the Somali National Army; enhance Somali National Army capacity to conduct civil-military coordination activities;
- (e) jointly with partners, enhance Somali National Army capacity to conduct counter-improvised explosive devices operations;
- (f) ensure compliance with the rules of engagement, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and all international best practices;
- (g) support specialised training, advising and mentoring and provide operational support, including joint patrols and protection of vital installations, to the Somali police in line with the Somali Transition Plan;
- (h) support the service delivery capacity of the Somali police in the provision of policing services, across Somalia through police generation and deployments;
- (i) Support police-public partnerships for increased resilience to radicalisation to violence, violent extremism conducive to terrorism and social disorder through community policing and to support the efforts of the Somali police forces in the compliance of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, women peace and security resolutions and conduct and discipline standards;
- (j) across the clear-hold-build phases of ATMIS operations, undertake activities to support the ATMIS uniformed components, as well as Somali security forces operating jointly with ATMIS, to carry out their operations in

full compliance with obligations under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to Non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP), as well as in compliance with the African Union Compliance and Accountability Framework for Peace Support Operations;

- (k) support early recovery initiatives in newly recovered areas, and humanitarian liaison;
- (l) support the implementation of the Somali National Stabilisation Strategy;
- (m) support relevant Somali ministries and institutions to implement the Somali Transition Plan priorities and provide necessary support in realising the objectives of ATMIS(UNSC, 2022: 8-9)

The council appealed to the African Union to ensure structures are in place to deliver:

- (a) clear oversight of ATMIS, and accountability mechanisms for the mission and its contingents;
- (b) clear command and control of the mission and operational coordination between its contingents;
- (c) coordinated operational decision-making under the Force Commander and Sector Commanders;
- (d) command, control and accountability of mission-enabling units, including air assets;
- (e) the creation, and deployment of mobile forces in ATMIS sectors; and
- (f) that ATMIS instructions are to remain politically neutral and prioritise the protection of civilians (UNSC, 2022: 9).

Although AMISOM was concluded, the mission was changed to ATMIS. Deeply looking at the mandate of this mission, it has overcome to a point that the Council realized the handover was not met, yet consolidates the weakness of the local forces and further tasks the mission to participate in operation instead of focusing on the departure.

The AMISOM replacement to ATMIS seems to name change only since the troops are still the same however, the mission describes itself as a mission mandated “to fully implement the Somali Transition Plan (STP), a strategic plan that details the handover of security responsibilities from the African Union to the Federal Government of Somalia” (www.atmis-au.org, n.d.). This notes that ATMIS's focus is the downgrading of the troops and withdrawal after their mandate ends.

The mandates of AMISOM and ATMIS seem familiar in general. The council inlined ATMIS with the command and control of the AU as the previous AMISOM. However, comparing the previous AMISOM mandates and ATMIS, it seems the mandate of ATMIS is more detailed by looking at it as a single mandate and focusing on a variety of issues. The new things in this mandate include reconfiguring the mission in the structure, composition, equipment and disposition in favour of the security handover of local forces. The drawdown of the troops and preparation of ATMIS as it withdrew around 2,000 from the country and handed over some bases to SNA, preparing to withdraw 3,000 in the coming months (Dhaysane, 2023).

2.7. Conclusion

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established by the AU after the previously proposed mission IGADSOM failed to be deployed. The need for this came after both the AU and IGAD extraordinary meetings recalled to help the new government maintain functionality as the TFG relocated from Kenya to Jawhar then Baido. The expansion of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) endangered the TFG as the courts vowed to attack Baido, the hosting city of the TFG. The Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to protect the TFG and clashed with the Courts. The courts were defeated but Al-Shabab has grown the ashes of dismantled Courts and hazarded the weak TFG.

The AMISOM mission was founded in January 2007 and the deployment of its troops reached up to 22,146 troops as per the Security Council task. The mission's mandates were extended from 2007 to 2022, in this period various tasks, and strategic objectives were given by the UN Security Council. The mission was also receiving financial aid from the European Union as the organization stated that it funded €2.3 billion to AMISOM and assured to continue supporting the newly

formed ATMIS. In addition to this point, the UN was providing logistical support to the mission and had a presence office on the ground.

The AMISOM mission was concluded on 1st April 2022 and replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the mandate of 12 months to continue AMISOM. The new mission overtook the financial support, and troops of the lately disbanded AMISOM.

Looking deeper at Security Council Resolutions such as 1477 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2073 (2012), 2182 (2014), 2297 (2016), 2372 (2017) 2472 (2019) and 2628 (2022) on ATMIS, it seems that the the main priorities of the mandates included the protection of the government and the achievement of the expected deployment number. Maintenance of sectors in the liberated areas and to work on the provision of reconciliations. The most crucial task was to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and carry out offensive operations against them. The mission was tasked to conduct a joint operation with Somali Security Forces and engage with locals in the recovered areas. The mission was asked to work steady handover of security responsibilities to local forces.

Profoundly sighting the mandates of AMISOM, it is undeniable that the reason the Security Council over-extended and changed the prioritization or assigned core strategic objectives was barriers that ground challenges caused. The mission lasted over fifteen years and if it deeply looked, the mandates were not mixed or confusing. It looks like the reality on the ground and the expected outcomes were different. The next Chapter will assess and analyze the challenges that AMISOM enduring during their timeline of executing these mandates by presenting the available scholarly literature on the mission.

CHAPTER THREE

AN ANALYSIS OF AMISOM ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

This chapter covers compromise and contrasts the achievements and challenges that AMISOM encountered during its operations in Somalia. It deeply and critically analyses the mission accomplishment and areas that had setbacks. The AMISOM's achievements are notably summarized in that the mission officially claimed points. Remarkably, the protection of the Federal government, operations that it carried out and other significant achievements that the mission claims on its official site will be covered.

The crucial sections of this chapter are the literature analyses of the AMISOM challenges that include contributing countries' interests in the mission, the disunification of the chain command and the implication of the sector division. This chapter will look at the operational challenges and if the mission received enough resources, and cooperation with local forces. Moreover, this chapter will first examine the division and conflicting interests among troops contributed to countries, and then, it will discuss a dilemma in the mission's success and the hostile environment that it started. It further discusses the logistical and financial challenges that the mission faced. After that, it will concentrate on the impact of the disunified command post and sector divisions. Then, it delves into the broken relationship with the Somali National Army (SNA), misconduct and civilian casualties and it will finally look at the vulnerable Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).

3.1. AMISOM Achievements

This thesis tends to conduct an assessment of AMISOM, however, it is necessary to present the achievement of the mission and examine the setbacks later. AMISOM's mission has been active for over fifteen years. Through all these years, AMISOM achieved some of its target tasks. In his article, Sabastiano Rwengabo states that AMISOM restored peace and security in Somalia and repulsed the terrorist strongholds including Mogadishu (Rwengabo, 2016: 92). The BBC Somali program report emphasised that AMISOM was deployed in 2007 at a time when only 4 districts of the capital were under the control of the Somali government while the other 12 districts were occupied by the terrorists. In 10 years, AMISOM helped Somalia to reach some regions and establish both regional government and the presence of the federal system (www.bbc.com/somali, 2017).

After the liberation of Mogadishu, the AMISOM mission expanded to other regions in southern parts of Somalia. The below table shows the significant operations that the mission carried out between 2012 to 2015. The achievements of these operations were the protection of key supply routes, the prevention of Al-Shabaab's illegal taxations and to reach areas under the control of the terrorist such as the key strategic port city of Kismayo. The main target of these AMISOM operations was the fulfilment of the mandates tasks of the UN Security Council Resolution 2297 (2016) to secure the main supply routes.

Table 5. AMISOM Operations in 2012-2015

Operation	Purpose	Period	Major achievements
<i>Operation Jubba Corridor</i>	The operation liberated the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions. The mission disrupted the supply and prevented illegal tax collections of Al-Shabaab.	Mid-2015	Liberated Baardhere and Dinsor, among other cities
<i>Operation Ocean Build</i>	Aimed to protect the main supply	Late 2014–mid-2015	Maintained hold in liberated areas
<i>Operation Indian Ocean</i>	Liberate militant-held areas, disrupt supply routes, prevent illegal tax collection	Mid-2014–mid- 2015	Liberated many coastal towns, including al-Shabaab stronghold Barawe
<i>Operation</i>	Liberate militant-held areas, disrupt	Early 2014–mid-2014	Liberated 11 districts

<i>Eagle</i>	supply routes, prevent illegal tax collection		across sectors 4
<i>Operation Sledge-hammer</i>	Liberate Kismayo	September 2012	Pushed al-Shabaab out of Kismayo
(Mahmood and Ani, 2017: 8)			

AMISOM notes on its official site that since its deployment in 2007, the mission’s military component has helped the Somali Security Forces (SSF) to militarily uproot Al-Shabaab from much of southern Somalia. It adds that AMISOM formed a secure environment that permitted the Somali peace process to take place, the mission facilitated the local population an opportunity by beginning the establishment of accountable local governance institutions to carry out services as well as rebuild the economy. Furthermore, AMISOM claims that Mogadishu, the capital city transformed, the economy boomed and the effects are far from confined to Mogadishu (AMISOM, 2023). In 2014, the VOA reported that in the cause of improved security in Mogadishu, the government started rebuilding the key economic infrastructures such as airports and seaports with the support of Türkiye (Billow, 2014).

The mission summarized its achievements in four points. Firstly, AMISOM worked on the protection of the TFG and ensured Somalia’s Federal Government. This was the main task that the Security Council mandates to AMISOM in 2007 as the resolution stated AMISOM “to provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government and security for key infrastructure” (UNSC, 2007: 2). Secondly, AMISOM degraded the Al-Shabab threat and pushed its militias from Mogadishu and other AMISOM sectors. Thirdly, AMISOM supported the expansion of humanitarian aid and fourthly, with the collaboration of SSF, AMISOM provided a security foundation that enabled all other international actors to operate in Somalia safely. Apart from these four points, AMISOM notes the operations it conducted. After the preliminary deadlock between AMISOM and armed groups in Somalia in 2007-2010, AMISOM conducted offensive operations to capture cities under the control of Al-Shabab. The mission adds that it carried out major offensive operations notably, Panua Eneo (2011); Free

Shabelle, Eagles (March 2014), Indian Ocean (November 2014), Ocean Build (Nov 2014-July 2015), Juba Corridor (July 2015), Badbaado 1a and 1b (2018-2019). This led salvation of the vast cities and allowed governance, economic, social, and political activities to flourish in the country (www.amisom-au.org, 2022). The defeat of Al-Shabaab from the capital was a “golden victory for the Somali people” as the late government spokesman and then major of Mogadishu Eng. Abdirahman Omar Osman Yarisow told reports in 2011 (www.aljazeera.com, 2011)

To the existence, Al-Shabaab had a strong presence in Mogadishu and other bordering regions and it was an imminent threat to the weak Federal government in Mogadishu. The bullets fired by Al-Shabaab were reaching the presidential place before the AMISOM and Somalia Security operation to secure Mogadishu corridors. This was a significant contribution to the stabilization of Somalia since the capital city was the focal point and target of the all-armed groups (Maruf and Joseph, 2018: 17-109)

The mission similarly highlighted its contribution of other capabilities other than offensive operations.

“AMISOM also made significant contributions to the capacitation of the Somali Police Force (SPF) through institutional and individual capacity building of the SPF by way of training, mentoring, advising, and initiating Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The SPF has benefitted and continue to benefit from operational support from the component via joint patrols and securing various elections. AMISOM's efforts in this regard has led to an improved law and order situation and enhancement of collaboration between the Police and Somali communities” (www.amisom-au.org, 2022).

On the other hand, the mandates that the AMISOM assigned by the UN Security Council were far larger than the above-mentioned achievements as it is noted in the previous chapter. However, some challenges possibly forced the mission not to make the expected progress over fifteen years. These challenges touched on various areas

of the mission, thus, the below section will insightfully glance at the main factors that limited the mission's ability to perform better and execute its work effectively.

3.2. AMISOM Challenges

The challenges that AMISOM faced during its existence included pre-existed and durational challenges but first of all, to understand more about the scenarios of AMISOM challenges, the governing body of AMISOM which is the AU has obstacles to achieving its manifesto strategy of the African Solutions to African problems on the AU Peace Operation in both Sudan's Darfur region and Somalia. These obstacles are noted in a study conducted by Bewuketu Dires Gardachew which found that the AU faced obstacles in "the limited financing from AU member states, weak military capacity, and division among member states over intervention, achieving the ambitious objective of African solutions to African problems will remain impossible for the foreseeable future" (Gardachew, 2020: 2-17).

It appears that the AU's weakness and incapacibilities passed to the mission and mainly shaped the challenges that AMISOM endured in its existing period. These challenges include divisions among members, shortage of resources, poor planning strategy, unwelcoming environment, absence of effective local partners or broken relations with local partners. The below points will explain the details of these challenges.

3.2.1. Conflicting Interests In Troops Contributing Countries

The notable point to emphasise first is why the six Contributing Countries vowed the deployment of their troops. Williams's article argues that contributing countries had national interests in the mission. Uganda's president wanted to boost his image as an international alliance against terrorism and build a reputation as a regional leader while the UPDF would receive weighty training, military financing, and equipment options from the US and keep troops busy outside the country. This would also have economic benefits for Uganda. Burundians have been driven by the factor of getting a both national and international reputation in linking international donors, hacking professionalism for its army and receiving newly composed army and financial benefits. The Djiboutian President's aim in joining AMISOM was to enhance his regime's political relationships with its key regional partners and external donors,

and for his military to gain new funds, equipment, infrastructure, and training. Kenya launched unilateral operation 'Linda Nchi' in Somalia and the reason for joining "AMISOM was not driven principally by security concerns but instead by the benefits of re-hatting some of its forces that were already deployed in Somalia to gain the mantle of multilateral legitimacy for continued operations, and to ease the Kenyan government's financial burden". The Sierra Leones wanted to build a positive reputation for its armed forces as joining peace operations was a valuable source of funds for them through reimbursements. Ethiopia's initial preference was to address security threats emanating from Somalia via unilateral action. This decision was taken primarily for financial reasons (Williams, 2018: 174-185).

The mission establishment is criticized to be an early attempt. In a paper published by the World Peace Foundation on African Politics, the African Peace Project argues that AMISOM's mandate was rushed to the cause of neighbouring countries' political and security interests. The threat assessment on the ground was not realistic as the planners restricted the mission's role to the protection of the government. This defensive move was not suitable in hostile and met a fierce military from Al-Shabaab. This resulted in mandate upgradation and the need for more troops. The mission's dependence on logistical support from the UN was also a challenge as the UN's tailored traditional peacekeeping was ill-suited to the volatile and chaotic environment, the paper adds that the UN did not provide lethal support such as ammunition. Unified support and training of Somali Security Forces were not met, each TCC and donor provided trains and separately operated with them and comprehensive training for Somali National Security Forces failed (Foundation, 2016: 1-3).

The contribution of the neighbouring countries was driven by the pursuit of the national interests. A conflicting national interest between Kenya and Ethiopia on AMISOM's stabilization in Somalia was among the weak points that the Danish Institute for International Studies mentioned. For Kenya's side, it is an interest meant to disturb Al-Shabaab's ability to operate the border between Somalia and Kenya. It is necessary to remember that Al-Shabaab conducted an attack inside Kenya at Westgate Mall of Nairobi and the Garissa University siege cost the lives of Kenyans,

the presence of Kenyan Defence Forces in the port city of Kismayo Somalia has a strategic and economic interest while Ethiopian side was driven by the interest of controlling the border between Somalia and Ethiopia and the historic hostile between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu that Ethiopia is against the effective and strong central government in Somalia, let alone a strong army. The Ethiopians favoured backing local militias on the border and extended training and funds for it (Studies, 2015: 2-4).

These points significantly highlight the unlike-minded participant countries that applied their miscellaneous interests to the mission. The implications of such a broken target will always result in unpleasant consequences. Therefore, it is evident that countries were not fully committed to the mission first, secondly, their target was not to stabilise the countries but on the contrary, to achieve their strategic objectives. Thus, the TCCs advanced their national interests first and did not bear in mind the fulfilment of their mandates and duties. This is against the given mandates of AMISOM and serves the opposite purpose.

3.2.2. Dilemma In Mission's Success And Active War In Somalia

The AU and the UN had fundamental concerns about the mission's successes. The literature notes that there were disagreements between the AU and UN over whether a military peace operation was an appropriate response to the conditions in Mogadishu in early 2007 and external actors did not have united thoughts on how to engage the situation in Somalia. Williams noted in 2013 that AMISOM was facing seven strategic challenges notably the preliminary cynicism about the mission's success; glitches in AMISOM's internal coordination, the absence of a local partner, the challenge in strategic coordination with external partners, the complexity of Al-Shabaab's nature, lack of adequate resources to execute its mandates and difficult in enabling genuine and active governance structures as AMISOM were deployed beyond Mogadishu (Williams, 2013: 223)

The fundamental problems brought a lack of sufficient guidelines to AMISOM. The International Crises Group reports that the AMISOM mission had fundamental problems. These problems include that AMISOM did not receive sufficient

guidelines on its tasks and achieving mechanisms and its existing strategy. The report adds that the cause of this problem was the lack of adequate appreciation during the planning stages of the complex nature of the task. An offensive would put considerable pressure on Al-Shabaab, but it is not clear how much attention has been given to a political strategy for holding and stabilising liberated areas (Group, 2011: 17-18)

The hostile environment in the AMISOM troops was always a challenge. However, it is clear that the pre-deployment assessment was poor since there were doubts about the success of the mission or the reality on the ground was not considered a significant challenge. The issue related to local receptions as people had greaves for Ethiopian invasions seems not prioritized. Apart from the conflicting interests of the countries, the mission's lack of sufficient guidelines made tight to move forward. Therefore, taking such an uncertain move brought an unpleasant outcome that not only affected the mission work but risked the lives of the troops whereby a high number of casualties was reported (Maruf, 2023).

3.2.3. Logistical And Financial Challenges

The type of the mission was not clarified at the beginning whilst the the absence of enough logistics and resources existed. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies' interview with Simon Mulongo, former deputy to the AU Commission in Mogadishu, narrates that AMISOM's achievements would have been impossible if the mission relied on the traditional peacekeeping template. This was staying encamped with limited petrol and firing back if fired on the other hand, Al-Shabaab uses complex warfare tactics of urban, guerrilla and terrorist acts. The Center also mentions that AMISOM faced logistical and supply challenges. At the time of the report, AMISOM had three helicopters which is minuscule as it could not cover the entire mission operation of 4,000 Kilometer Square (KM²). The mission was contingent-centred and the troop-contributed country had control over it while the mission's influence was deemed low. Al-Shabaab had much better accessibility to intelligence than the mission by using the population under their control areas. The lack of requisite force enabler hardened AMISOM's ability to hold liberated areas (Studies, 2018: 1-4).

The AMISOM's head publically acknowledged the mission funds crises. Amb. Francisco Madeira stated that the troops were ready but could not move due to lack of resources. The ambassador added that a lack of funds could endanger the hard-won against the militants Al-Shabaab (Hassan, 2017). With the lack of funds passed to the AU transition mission ATMIS, the UN political affairs chief has emphasized the critical and essential to ensuring funding for the ATMIS, cautioning that a deficit could hazard plans to transfer security to Somali Security Forces (www.news.un.org, 2023).

The troops contributing countries had withdrawn from the mission for funds issues while others threatened to withdraw if the funding needs were not met. Although troops rejoined the mission later, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from AMISOM in 2016 for lack of support. The move of the Ethiopians came after the EU funds were cut and their stations were occupied by Al-Shabaab suddenly (www.bbc.com, 2016). It is necessary to outline that the troop-contributing country, Uganda emphasised this issue and threatened to withdraw its forces if the international partners did not provide the support that was needed (www.trtworld.com, 2019). The World Peace Foundation on African Politics, African Peace Project report (Foundation, 2016: 1-3) indicated these issues and the respondents confirmed the existence of this issue.

3.2.4. Disunified Command Post And Sector Divisions

The AMISOM TCCs seem to have had fragile cooperation on the mission operations. Adam Moe Fejerskov, Signe Cold-Ravnkilde and Peter Albrecht argue that AMISOM was not a peacekeeping mission as they connected their argument to the idea of peacekeeping mission should operate in already existing peace and thus since there was no tangible peace in Somalia at the time of AMISOM created it had nothing to do with a peacekeeping mission. The authors added that the negative effects and influence of regional interests brought to the fact that AMISOM did not genuinely plan, initiate or carry out operations while the contributed countries did as they saw strong self-interest in doing so. The mission had no cohesive and defined institutional framework as TCCs acted individually to combat Al-Shabaab, this was caused by national interests shape of operations and the willingness to have

command and control, logistical supply and sector divisions of the mission (Fejerskov, Cold-Ravnkilde and Albrecht, 2017: 1-17).

A weak headquarters and vacancy position existed while the mission target aim shifted from combat to stabilisation. The Danish Institute for International Studies notes that AMISOM was making progress in 2014 however, the mission lost momentum in the first half of 2015 due to weak headquarters there was a vacancy in key AMISOM leadership positions such as force commanders and the deputy commanders which caused by limited willingness of troop-contributing countries to find a replacement. This led to a disconnection between the AMISOM headquarters and its regional sectors. The institute adds that an international advisor to AMISOM stated that there was no functioning AMISOM headquarters at that time. The AMISOM's strategic shift from active combat to the stabilization stage and enabling the Federal Government to build institutions gave Al-Shabaab a chance to block the supply routines of liberated areas (Studies., 2015: 2-4).

The national interests harmed the mission chain command. Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein note that fragmentation caused by the national interest of Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia and weak central forces headquarters harmfully impacted the command and control of AMISOM and the achievement of the strategic direction, this resulted in the lack of cores objectives for Somalia's stabilization plan, combat against Al-Shabaab and rebuilding of the SNA forces. The mission's performance ceased in its corresponding sectors. The fragmentation privileged the achievement of their interests in AMISOM's strategic objectives (Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016: 50-61)

The absence of a cohesive approach made hard the expansion of the mission. An article by Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams argues that AMISOM's mission had challenges in its expansion. The two authors noted ten operational challenges that AMISOM endured. These challenges were that AMISOM lacked a cohesive and shared stabilization strategy on the mission. The mission had not advanced non-military response and it also faced separation of security and political dimension. The biggest and perhaps the most crucial challenge was fragmentation in command and

control. The resilience of the terrorist group, Al-Shabab downgraded the mission expansion as Al-Shabab melted into the public. The scarcity of troops was among the challenges that authors noted as the expected troops did not arrive as planned. The Somali public insecurity was among the thriving challenges that AMISOM's expansion while there was difficulty in bringing peace division as Al-Shabaab destroyed the frustrations in liberated areas. There was a challenge to the Somali National Army's capabilities as the training, arming, and supporting of the SNA forces proved challenging, which limited their operational capabilities. The last challenge mentioned in AMISOM's expansion was the difficulty in the provision of logistical support from the UNSOA (Lotze and Williams, 2016: 9-14).

The AU organized a conference in Nairobi on the mission's ten-year learned admitted the broken chain of command of the mission.

It was noted that effective operations require an effective command and control structure. Participants reiterated that AMISOM's command and control structures had not always performed effectively and could be improved. In many instances, the command of AMISOM troops was exercised not by the Force Commander but by the national capitals of the TCCs. In contrast, participants observed that command and control structures for AMISOM's police component had not suffered similar problems. To improve current command and control structures for the Mission's military component, it was suggested that TCC Governments should empower the Mission's senior leadership including the Force Commander to control his troops. Furthermore, communications should be strengthened; both by ensuring better communication between the AU, AMISOM and TCCs, as well as between the Mission Force Headquarters and Sector Commands. While the establishment of the intelligence (J2cell) had improved the situation, more could be done in this area (AU, 2017: 16).

The fragmentation did not appear in AMISOM's progress before 2012. However, there was a period gap between AMISOM's operation Juba Corridor which was carried out in July 2015, and Badbaado 1a and 1b of 2018-2019 (www.amisom-

au.org, 2022). This gap could be linked to the vacancy of AMISOM's forces command posts and the continued election in Somalia from 2016-2017 or disinflation damaged AMISOM's willingness to continue the liberation of the areas under the control of Al-Shabaab and thus made the mission static into sectors as stated Danish Institute for International Studies report (Studies, 2015: 2-4)

3.2.5. Broken Relation With The Somali National Army (SNA)

The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs conducted an assessment report on AMISOM's effectiveness in 2018 and summarized in three points; AMISOM could not undermine Al-Shabaab fighters and defeat by military means only, it required Somali leaders to reconcile and implement a strategy of either defeat or negotiate with Al-Shabaab which was not met. AMISOM operated in the absence of local partners that could work on the prioritisation of stabilization and settlement of recovered areas. The mission was under-resourced and lacked unified command and control between the headquarters and troops contributed countries (Affairs, 2018: 2-4).

However, a contrary article by Omar S. Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani published in the Institute of Security Studies mentions that collaboration from the Somali National Army (SNA) enabled AMISOM to drive out Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and size large areas in Southern and Central Somalia. This contradicts the assessment report that AMISOM lacked a local partner to operate with it (Mahmood and Ani, 2017: 1-28).

Nonetheless, apart from both these arguments, if the local forces were in place for the deployment of AMISOM, then the mission was not needed as the local forces could handle the security in Somalia. Furthermore, looking for the mandated assignment by the Security Council, the primary security responsibilities such as protection of the government, and the operations lay on AMISOM until resolution 2297 (2016) which tasked a joint operation between the two.

Apart from the argument of whether there were local forces or not, the issue of trust between AMISOM and SNA was among the stated challenges of the mission. As

Danish Institute For International Studies' Peter Albrecht notes there was a strong sense from the SNA, FGS and among Somali intellectuals that if the funds provided to AMISOM were given to Somalis (SNA) it could end Al-Shabaab and there were suspicions from SNA that AMISOM troops contributing countries, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia worked in their sole interest not the interest of unified Somalia and these countries fear that emerging strong Somali government would danger their economic interests in Somalia and regional security (Albrecht, 2015: 1-5).

The presence of Ethiopian troops in AMISOM intensified the adverse image of the mission in public. The invasion of Ethiopian troops in Somalia before was criticised and accused of indiscriminate killing of civilians which Human Rights Watch criticised while the AU remained silent on this issue. However, the light was shed on the allegation of international law violation by AMISOM and SNA. The involvement of the rival neighbouring countries made some African countries consider the mission too costly, dangerous and hard to achieve success (Dusterhöft and Gerlach, 2013: 18-23).

AMISOM and SNA lacked a harmonization strategy. A Heritage Institute for Policy Studies report published in January 2023 indicates the cause of the weak cooperation between AMISOM /ATMIS and SNA. The institute relates this issue to the existence of Al-Shabaab's ability to infiltrate with Somali army. The lack of good knowledge or opinion of locals about the AMISOM/ATMIS. This made it hard to achieve cooperation with locals. Thirdly, the institute points out that the location of AMISOM/ATMIS does not match the Somali army's stationed positions. The ATMIS Forward Operation Bases (FOBs) are located outside of the cities while SNA prefers the bases to be moved to areas close to water holes and transit routes. To transfer these FOBs to preferred SNA stations that needed bulldozers and new construction which required time and resources. This issue will impact the handover of the ATMIS FOBs to SNA in the future (Elmi & Williams, 2023: 4-28).

The broken relations resulted in a unilateral operation on the SNA side. The VOA Somali's Investigative Dossier program formally known as Galka Baarista reported that the former Somali Chief Defence Forces (CDF) and AMISOM commander had

a conflict with an operation in the Middle Shabelle region of AMISOM's sector five. The operation took more than one month and was led by General Odawa Yusuf Rageh, former CDF whereby AMISOM argued that it was not informed of the operation while the SNA side argued that the operation was successful without the participation of AMISOM. Both commanders filed complaint letters to the head of the AMISOM mission Amb. Francisco Madeira. The SNA accused Burundian contingents manned in the Middle Shabelle region were entertaining Al-Shabaab and faced the terrorists in a procrastination way and preferred to stay in the base instead of carrying out operations (www.voasomali.com, 2021).

The outcome of this literature proves the broken relations between AMISOM/ATMIS and SNA. In light of the legitimated mandates, the UN Security Council Resolution 2297 in 2016 tasked the mission to have joint operations with Somalia's Security forces. Therefore, this is morally against the principled duties and harms the mission. It seems the two entities' rivals were not taken into consideration and never being addressed loudly.

3.2.6. Misconduct And Civilian Casualties

The AMISOM troops were involved in the misconduct and selling of provided hardware such as military equipment and fuels. Five AMISOM troop members were arrested in 2016. The mission released a press statement confirming the arrest and stated the mission had zero tolerance for unprofessional conduct and ought to prosecute arrestees. The mission, later on, reported that nine of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UDPF) serving under AMISOM troops were sentenced to prison by UDPF Division Court Martial in Mogadishu. The sentence was between three years to eighteen months imprisonment (www.amisom-au.org, 2016). The extrajudicial civilian killing was accused by AMISOM troops. Apart from accusations, in 2021, AMISOM admitted that soldiers contributed by Uganda were found guilty of killing civilians in Golweyn village. Two of the soldiers were sentenced to death, while three others were to thirty-nine years in imprisonment (www.amisom-au.org, 2021).

The Human Rights Watch report titled (The Power These Men Over Us) indicates that the organization documented over 21 sexual exploitation and abuse incidents by

AMISOM personnel, the report reveals in detail the allegations of sexual abuse and rape of Somali women and girls. The report adds that the AMISOM personnel took advantage of the vulnerable women and girls in the delivery of humanitarian packages, those who seek medical care in AMISOM stations and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps near their bases (HRW, 2014: 18-42).

The UN Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014) expressed concerns about these allegations of sexual violence perpetrated by AMISOM troops and welcomed the AU's investigation into the matter (UNSC U. S., 2014, p. 8). However, the results of the investigation for sexual assaults are not available online. Such misconduct marks that troops acted out of discipline and broke international Human rights laws that the Council asked them to keep and abide by as the UN Security Council tasked in Resolution 2182 (2014) (UNSC, 2014: 8).

3.2.7. Vulnerable Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)

The Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) of the mission repeatedly encountered Al-Shabaab's complex attacks, which resulted in a deadly loss for AMISOM troops. The attacks overran the bases, killed stationed soldiers and published online propaganda videos. The latest was the attack on the Bulo-Mareer's UPDF contingent FOBs whereby Uganda's president confirmed that 54 soldiers were killed in May 2023 (www.newvision.co.ug, 2023). Harun Maruf of Voice of America Somali (VOA) reports that in an interview with the Special Representative of the AU Commission, Mohamed El-Amine Souef that at least 3,500 AMISOM personnel were killed in Somalia since its deployment in 2007, adding the disabled, the casualties would be around 5,000 in which the troops from Burundi and Uganda suffered the most (Maruf, 2023).

Williams summarized an empirical study of Al-Shabaab's attack on six of the forward bases in Leego (June 26, 2015), Janaale (September 1, 2015), El Adde (January 15, 2016), Halgan (June 9, 2016), Kulbiyow (January 27, 2017), and El-Baraf (May 3, 2022). The author describes the reason that made the bases susceptible to terrorist attacks and he presented nine points to dispersed forces stationed in large spaces of land. The mission allocated small forces of not more than one company per

station while Al-Shabaab would attack with massive fighters which is hard-to-rebel. The AMISOM troops were static forces and stopped conducting offensive operations against the terrorists, which resulted in the Al-Shabaab attack. The mission was ill-resourced and lacked enough capabilities to cover the operational area, One of the issues was the engineering and construction of the fence there were limited bulldozers and front-end loaders to construct a strong defence base and left them poorly defended forces, AMISOM remained only land operating forces, although there were few helicopters it did not stop Al-Shabaab to move freely and attack the FOBs. The other points he stated were that the variety of the number of TCCs caused disjointed forces while AMISOM also failed to implement countermeasures in nature's unadaptable forces. For the last, the author notes that AMISOM's FOBs lacked cooperation with both the local inhabitants and Somali Security Forces. For Al-Shabaab, it has flourished in organizational adaptivity, exploited sanctuaries, gathered good intelligence, and tactical innovation, and made surprise attacks (Williams, 2023: 2-24).

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter examined the achievements and challenges that AMISOM faced during its presence in Somalia. The AMISOM mission was concluded in 2022 and replaced by ATMIS, a transitional mission with extended mandates. The AMISOM's achievements are notably summarized in that the mission officially claimed points. Remarkably, the protection of the Federal government, operations that it carried out and other significant achievements that the mission claims on its official site. The mission stated that it had achievements in uprooting Al-Shabaab, providing a safe package for humanitarian delivery, and helping the establishment of return of administration. The mission adds that it provided a workable site for international organizations and with the cooperation of SSF, AMISOM conducted offensive operations such as *Panua Eneo* (2011); *Free Shabelle, Eagles* (March 2014), *Indian Ocean* (November 2014), *Ocean Build* (Nov 2014-July 2015), *Juba Corridor* (July 2015), *Badbaado 1a and 1b* (2018-2019) and liberated Al-Shabaab from areas under their control.

The mission was deployed at a time when only 4 districts of the capital were under the control of the Somali government while the other 12 districts were occupied by the terrorists thus the literature states that AMISOM restored peace and security in Somalia and repulsed the terrorist strong-holds including Mogadishu and helped Somalia to reach some regions and establish both regional government and the presence of the federal system. It further adds that in the cause of improved security in Mogadishu, the government started rebuilding the key economic infrastructures such as airports and seaports with the support of Türkiye. This was a “golden victory for the Somali people” On the Somali government's side since Al-Shabaab had a strong presence in the capital city, Mogadishu.

On the other hand, the mandates of AMISOM were greater than these achievements and understandably some challenges forced the mission to make less progress than expected. There was division and conflicting interests among troops contributed to countries, a dilemma in the mission’s success and the active war that it started. Furthermore, there were logistical and financial challenges while disunified command posts and sector divisions had impacts on the mission. AMISOM had a broken relationship with the Somali National Army (SNA), there was misconduct and civilian casualties whilst the vulnerability in the mission’s Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) existed.

The six troop-contributing countries had national interests in the mission. These interests include the aim of boosting images as an international ally against terrorism and getting investment in their military capabilities while neighbouring countries had both strategic and security interests on the mission and these conflicting national interest between Kenya and Ethiopia on the mission was among the weak points AMISOM’s stabilization in Somalia. The literature adds that the establishment of the mission was rushed to the cause of neighbouring countries’ political and security interests. The threat assessment on the ground was not realistic as the planners restricted the mission’s role to the protection of the government.

The mission was facing a dilemma on the mission success. The AU and UN had different concerns about whether a military peace operation was an appropriate

response to the conditions in Mogadishu in early 2007. In addition to that, there were fundamental problems that brought a lack of sufficient guidelines to AMISOM. The mission did not receive sufficient guidelines on its tasks and achieving mechanisms and its existing strategy.

The mission had financial and logistic challenges. This was a deadlock for the mission expansion, and continuity of the operations, and hardened the AMISOM to conduct its mandated duties. The mission had only three helicopters which is minuscule as it could not cover the entire mission operation of 400,000 kilometres. The leadership of the mission argued that the troops were ready but could not move due to a lack of resources. This could have endangered the hard-won against the militants Al-Shabaab whilst passed to the AU transition mission ATMIS, the UN political affairs chief has emphasized the critical and essential to ensuring funding for the ATMIS, cautioning that a deficit could hazard plans to transfer security to Somali Security Forces. The troops contributing countries had withdrawn from the mission for funds issues while others threatened to withdraw if the funding needs were not met, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from AMISOM in 2016 and rejoined later. Uganda emphasised this issue and threatened to withdraw its forces if the international partners did not provide the support that was needed.

There was disunification of command posts and sector divisions centred the TCCs directly to their contingents and were giving orders and guidelines from their soldier. The mission had no cohesive and defined institutional framework as TCCs acted individually to combat Al-Shabaab. A weak headquarters and vacancy position existed while the mission target aim shifted from combat to stabilisation. The mission lost momentum in the first half of 2015 due to weak headquarters there was a vacancy in key AMISOM leadership positions such as force commanders and deputy commanders which was caused by the limited willingness of troop-contributing countries to find a replacement. The AU organized a conference in Nairobi on the mission's ten-year learned admitted the broken chain of command of the mission.

The cooperation and relations between SNA and AMISOM were broken as a result of mistrust that existed. This hurt the mission to work smoothly and execute its work.

It also passed to the current transitional mission ATMIS. There was a strong sense from the SNA, FGS and among Somali intellectuals that if the funds provided to AMISOM were given to Somalis (SNA) it could end Al-Shabaab and there were suspicions from SNA that AMISOM troops contributed countries. Therefore, AMISOM and SNA lacked a harmonization strategy. The broken relations resulted in a unilateral operation on the SNA side in 2021. To remember, the UN Security Council Resolution 2297 in 2016 tasked the mission to have joint operations with Somalia's Security forces. Therefore, this is morally against the principled duties and harms the mission.

AMISOM troops were involved in misconduct acts and civilian casualties. The literature showed that AMISOM contingents from the UPDF were caught red-handed for selling their provided logistics and hardware and sentenced in Mogadishu. Similarly, the UPDF members were found guilty of killing civilians in Golweyn village in 2021, hence, a death sentence was condemned by the court. The Human Rights Watch documented over 21 sexual exploitation and abuse incidents by AMISOM personnel and took advantage of vulnerable women and girls in the delivery of humanitarian packages. Since AMISOM was divided into sectors, the troops stationed in their bases and stuck to remain in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). This static action gave Al-Shabaab the opportunity and conduct offensive and complex attacks on AMISOM bases which latest was the UPDF base in the Buulo-Mareer.

This chapter says that AMISOM fulfilled its first task, preserved the government from collapsing and protected its authority against Al-Shabaab. It appears that AMISOM's challenges hinder the mission to achieve what was expected to achieve. Hence, this means that AMISOM did too little to what was mandated and after the fifteen years of presence marks AMISOM failed to overcome these repetitive challenges.

CONCLUSION

This study conducted an assessment of challenges on AMISOM from 2007 to 2022. It is evident and noted in the literature that the contemporary Somalia conflict is multi-layered from power competition, clan dynamics, terrorism, and foreign interventions to a weak central government. The conflict involved several armed groups and comprised clan militias and armed terrorist groups but throughout history apart from terrorism, inter-clan conflicts used to be resolved through traditions, norms and customs.

Several reconciliation conferences, international interventions and invasions held in Somalia since the civil war broke out. Somalia was the first country that chapter five of the UN Charter was applied in the history of the UN and established for UN mission without the consent of the government because there was no government in Somalia at that time. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (I and II) did not stabilize the country, however, it has delivered humanitarian assistance for the needy people. The mission was concluded after it had clashes with locals and the situation got hostile. The movement of armed Islamist groups was emerging and posed a threat to not only Somalia but also the neighbouring countries. The Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in an unjustified move and destroyed the strongholds of the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyah in the Gedo region while the remaining bases of the AIAI were eliminated by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has once again arisen in Somalia's conflict and spread to South-Central Somalia. Ethiopia once again invaded Somalia and destroyed the ICU. From the ashes of the ICU, an extremist Al-Shabaab developed and posed an imminent threat to the weak transitional Federal Government. Thus, the late Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed visited

Addis Ababa and asked the AU to deploy troops and help Somalia for the reconciliation and re-establishment of the government.

The literature reports that the East African Regional bloc, IGAD wanted to establish an IGADSOM mission and deploy troops, however, the AU came forward and established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The deployment of the troops started in 2007 whereby six African countries participated in the mission until it was concluded in 2022. AMISOM was transferred to the Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and is expected to be concluded next year if an extension would not be needed. In addition to that, the details of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mandates of AMISOM from their AU beginning tasks to the Security Council Resolutions such as 1477 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2073 (2012), 2182 (2014), 2297 (2016), 2372 (2017), 2472 (2019) and 2628 (2022) on ATMIS was addressed in details.

This study aimed to explore the mission achievement and the areas that had setbacks and conducted an assessment of challenges in AMISOM. It deeply and critically analyses the mission accomplishment and areas that had setbacks. Remarkably, the protection of the Federal government, operations that it carried out and other significant achievements that the mission claims on its official site. The mission stated that it had achievements in uprooting Al-Shabaab, providing a safe package for humanitarian delivery, protecting the Somali government and helping the establishment of return of administration.

It is worth mentioning that AMISOM was deployed at a time when only 4 districts of the capital were under the control of the Somali government while the terrorists occupied the rest. Therefore, AMISOM restored peace and security in Somalia and repulsed the terrorist strong-holds including Mogadishu. In the cause of improved security in Mogadishu, the government started rebuilding the key economic infrastructures such as airports and seaports with the support of Türkiye. This was a “golden victory for the Somali people” on the Somali government's side since Al-Shabaab had a strong presence in the capital city, Mogadishu.

On the other hand, the analysis of available literature presents that the mission had challenges as it started TCCs had national interests in the mission, and there was a dilemma in the mission's success as it ended up in an active war. The planning strategy seems poor and the reality on the ground was not fully assessed. The most mentionable countries were the neighbouring countries that prioritized their national interest first. Since these countries focused on their target, the main mission ambitions were lost and therefore the mission progress before 2015 was deemed low.

The financial and logistical challenges were a deadlock for the mission expansion, and continuity of the operations, and hardened the AMISOM to conduct its mandated duties. The mission had only three helicopters and covered the entire area of the mission operations ground. On several occasions, the leadership of the mission presented that the mission could not move due to financial issues. In addition, the TCCs threatened to withdraw the mission if the funds were not met. However, this issue still affected ATMIS.

The chain of command was broken as the AU report shows. There was a vacancy in the top positions while the mission had no cohesive and defined institutional framework as TCCs acted individually to combat Al-Shabaab. This caused the mission to lose its momentum in the middle of 2015. Furthermore, the relations and cooperation between AMISOM and SNA were also broken as mistrust existed. Thus, this shows that AMISOM and SNA lacked a harmonization strategy. This was a defying of Security Council Resolution 2297 in 2016 that tasked the mission to have joint operations with Somalia's Security forces.

AMISOM troops were involved in misconduct acts and civilian casualties. The literature showed that AMISOM contingents from the UPDF were caught red-handed for selling their provided logistics and hardware and sentenced in Mogadishu. Similarly, the UPDF members were found guilty of killing civilians in Golweyn village in 2021, hence, a death sentence was condemned by the court.

Under these circumstances, the study argues that it is necessary to deeply examine the situation on the grounds and assessment conducted so troops would not end up in a hostile environment in future AU missions. In the case of AMISOM is evident that something went wrong with the pre-assessment judgments as it seems that the planning team took the case easy and doable without further examinations.

The importance of securing enough resources can play in the smooth work of the AU or other missions become vital, therefore it is essential to consider locating the funds of the mission before it is established. This AMISOM mission was the largest mission that the AU ever managed and it failed to produce the needed resources. This issue is a lesson in future missions and thus created after significant and enough resources are secured for it. The ATMIS mission is at a critical juncture, therefore, it will be vocal achievement a to meet both the deadline and mandate together. It is very clear that the above-stated challenges are also affecting ATMIS, but, if all parts are not addressing it extremely, it will force ATMIS to lose the target and unnecessary mandate extension. Therefore, ATMIS needs to put an important consideration to make the deadline done.

It seems and became a clear example in the case of Somalia that local partners are the crucial backbone for the missions and have the desire needed on the ground. Therefore, giving priority to future missions priority or even the current ATMIS would have positive impacts. Thus, the Somali local forces have to be prepared so that ATMIS would have their replacement local forces able to take over the country's security responsibilities.

Even though AMISOM seemed to have achieved its core mandate of the protection of the government, the mission endured several challenges such as budgetary logistical problems, conflicting national interests of the troop-contributing countries, broken chain of command, lack of cooperation with the local forces, and vulnerabilities in their Forward Operation Bases (FOBs). It

looked to the existence that these were the major challenges until the end of the AMISOM mission and forced the mission not to fulfil all of its mandates.



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Appendix 1

United Nations

S/RES/2297 (2016)



Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2016

Resolution 2297 (2016)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on
7 July 2016**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Underlining its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

Condemning recent Al Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing serious concern* at the ongoing threat posed by Al Shabaab, and *underlining* its concern that Al Shabaab continues to hold territory and extort revenue in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of civilian life, in Al Shabaab attacks, and *paying tribute* to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali Security Forces personnel in the fight against Al Shabaab,

Reiterating its determination to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia, and *underlining* its commitment to support an inclusive Somali-led political peace and reconciliation process,

Expressing grave concern at the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia,

Welcoming the positive contributions that the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) has made to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and *underscoring* the importance of an effective partnership between the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and Member States in Somalia,

Recognizing that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has a responsibility to protect its citizens and build its own national security forces, *noting* that these forces should be inclusive and representative of Somalia and act in full compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *reaffirming* the intent of international partners to support the FGS in achieving this,

16-11665 (E)



Please recycle



Welcoming the FGS and regional leaders' endorsement of a new National Security Policy, *calling on* the FGS to accelerate its implementation in view of the remaining threat posed by Al-Shabaab, *underlining* the importance of further defining the composition of Somalia's national security forces, identifying capability gaps in order to guide AMISOM and donors' security sector assistance priorities and signalling areas of cooperation with the international community, and *noting* the international community's intention to support the FGS in security sector reform,

Recognizing that a more stable Somalia is of vital importance to ensuring regional security,

AMISOM

Commending the contribution of AMISOM to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, *noting* its critical role in improving the security situation, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops, police and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and other African nations, and *recognizing* the significant sacrifices made by AMISOM forces,

Welcoming the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, as well as support from other bilateral partners to both AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA), and *emphasizing* the importance of new contributions, including from the African Union Peace Fund, the private sector, civil society and other donations, in order to share the financial burden of supporting AMISOM,

Taking note of the African Union Peace and Security Council's communiqué of 28 April 2016 on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM,

Welcoming the holding of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the troop and police contributing countries of AMISOM in Djibouti on 28 February 2016, and their commitment to improving coordination within AMISOM and to the revitalisation of AMISOM operations, *welcomes* the development of the revised Concept of Operations 2016 for AMISOM, as endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council on 29 June 2016 and *looks forward* to its implementation,

Welcoming the AU's investigation of allegations of sexual violence against some AMISOM troops, *underlining* the importance of the AU implementing the recommendations of the report, and in line with resolution 2272 (2016), *calling on* the AU and troop-contributing countries to ensure that allegations are properly and thoroughly investigated and appropriate and timely follow-up action is taken, including full investigation of those cases of abuse referred to the AU investigation team,

Expressing concern over the continued activities of Al Shabaab and reports of pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) elements in Somalia and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

AMISOM

1. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission;

2. *Continues to agree* with the revised benchmarks as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 July 2015, *agrees* with his conclusion that the achievement of the benchmarks could pave the way for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation which could help consolidate the peace process in Somalia and the development of Somali security sector institutions, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep these benchmarks under continuous review, in consultation with the AU;

3. *Underlines* that the increases in the force strength decided in resolution 2036 (2012) and 2124 (2013) are to provide short term enhancement to AMISOM's military capacity, and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM's force strength will be considered in light of progress on the ground;

Priorities and tasks

4. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017, and *further decides* that AMISOM shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;

5. *Decides to authorize* AMISOM to implement the following strategic objectives:

(a) Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(b) Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia;

(c) Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces;

6. *Decides to authorize* AMISOM to carry out the following priority tasks:

(a) To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(b) To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces;

(c) To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement;

(d) To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;

7. *Further decides* to authorize AMISOM to carry out the following essential tasks:

(a) To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS;

(b) To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(c) To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilisation by the United Nations Country Team and other actors;

(d) To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;

(f) To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report, in consultation with the FGS and AMISOM, on progress in securing key supply routes as described in paragraph 6 (d) in his written reports on the situation in Somalia to the Security Council;

9. *Requests* that, in line with the recommendations of the Joint AU-UN Review, the AU enable a surge in its efficiency and ensure that AMISOM is configured to conduct the full range of required operations effectively, in particular by strengthening command and control structures, enhancing cross-sector operations, examining sector boundaries, and generating a dedicated quick reaction forces' capability under the authority of the Force Commander, which should operate alongside existing Somali forces;

10. *Recalls* its request that the AU generate the specialised units set out in the annex to this resolution and as recommended by the Joint Report of 2 October 2013 and set out in the Secretary-General's letter of 14 October 2013, within in the existing troop ceiling, and authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012), and ensuring that all force enablers and multipliers operate under the command of the Force Commander, and *further requests* that these are generated without delay and reflected in the revised Concept of Operations and requests regular updates on this force generation through the Secretary-General;

11. *Stresses* the critical need to source contingent-owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution

2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM troop-contributing countries or other Member States, *emphasizes* in particular the need for an appropriate aviation component of up to twelve military helicopters under the command of the Force Commander, and *urges* the immediate generation of this component;

12. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's commitment to work with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, troop-contributing countries, and Federal Government of Somalia to help ensure that a surge in efficiency materialises and is sustained over time, and reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to monitor implementation of the surge, including through performance indicators, and in this regard to keep the Council updated in the Secretary-General's regular reporting;

13. *Notes with concern* that the delay in the appointment of the Force Commander has impacted the Mission's effectiveness, *commends* the decision of the Government of Djibouti to nominate the Force Commander, and *looks forward* to his immediate deployment;

14. *Underlines* the importance of AMISOM forces carrying out their mandate in full compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and cooperating with UNSOM and UNSOS in implementing the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP), and *calls upon* the AU to investigate and report allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as continuing to ensure the highest standards of transparency, and conduct and discipline;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the HRDDP and to include progress made in implementing the policy in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council;

16. *Welcomes* the commencement of activities establishing a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013), and *underlines* the importance of making the CCTARC operational and effective without further delay, and in this regard *urges* the full support of troop and police contributors for the CCTARC, in collaboration with humanitarian, human rights and protection actors, and *underlines* the importance of ensuring information is shared with relevant actors including the United Nations;

17. *Requests* AMISOM to use its CCTARC as part of its reporting on joint AMISOM operations with the Somali security forces;

18. *Requests* the AU to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, and report to the Council, through the provision of oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, every 120 days with the first written report no later than 12 September 2016;

Support and partnership

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in supporting the implementation of this resolution, *further requests* the

Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU on the planning, deployment and strategic management of AMISOM through the United Nations office to the AU, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the need to increase AMISOM's efficiency, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing United Nations mechanisms;

20. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that a joint AMISOM-United Nations-Somali planning mechanism should assess and facilitate the delivery of AMISOM's mandate in line with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this resolution, ensuring in particular thorough coordination and consultation ahead of, during and after offensive operations;

21. *Reiterates* its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncommitted funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, *calls upon* the AU to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM, and *underlines* the AU's call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

22. *Emphasizes* the Report of the Joint United Nations-African Union Review of AMISOM of 2 October 2013 and the revised benchmarks as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 July 2015, and *agrees* with the Secretary-General that progress towards the further degradation of Al-Shabaab's capacity to launch attacks, in parallel with improving the capacity of Somali forces to progressively sustain control of areas recaptured from Al-Shabaab allowing the return of State authority, can enable a gradual reduction of AMISOM's role in Somalia, and allow a transition to a role of oversight and rapid response in support of the Somali security forces;

23. *Requests* that the AU, taking into account progress achieved in offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other terrorist organisations, by gradually, and in a limited manner, and where appropriate, reconfigure AMISOM uniformed personnel in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration as appropriate through the Secretary-General;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the African Union, to conduct a joint assessment mission of AMISOM, after the 2016 electoral process, to ensure that AMISOM is properly configured to support the next phase of state-building in Somalia, and to present options and recommendations to the Security Council by 15 April 2017;

25. *Stresses* the importance of the FGS accelerating the strengthening and improved coordination of the Somali security institutions, and enhancing efforts to move towards the eventual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security services, including through the establishment of a forum between the FGS, AU and United Nations to specifically plan for, and regularly monitor, the handover of security responsibilities, which is an essential part of AMISOM's eventual exit strategy, and *requests* regular updates on this trilateral coordination through the Secretary-General;

Somali Security Forces

26. *Calls for* the rapid implementation of the National Security Policy, and the federal policing model, and expeditious agreement on a Somali federal security sector architecture, which clearly defines the roles, responsibilities and structures of relevant security sector institutions as a way of improving coordination between AMISOM and the Somali security forces and ensuring coherence and sustainability of international assistance by UNSOM;

27. *Underscores* the importance of bilateral partners delivering on any pledged support as well as supporting UNSOM in implementing its mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance, and in this regard *emphasizes* the importance of UNSOM's mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance;

28. *Welcomes* the support already provided by the international community and bilateral donors to the Somali security sector, *encourages* partners to further enhance their support to the FGS for the development of the Somali security sector and *calls upon* new partners to come forward to support this development, and *reiterates* the importance of coordination amongst all partners;

29. *Underlines* that it is essential that military operations are followed immediately by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security;

30. *Welcomes* the commitment of the FGS and emerging Federal states to establish basic policing services across Somalia, as envisaged in the new federal policing model, *encourages* donors to support the FGS in its implementation, and *welcomes* capacity-building for the maritime police force in line with resolution 2246 (2015) by the FGS with the support of UNSOM, and *looks forward* to progress towards its implementation;

31. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's examination in his letter of 7 October 2015 (S/2015/762) of the concept and feasibility of the options available for entities to provide logistics support to the Puntland forces that are to be integrated into the SNA, *further notes* that such support to the SNA in Puntland be provided by a United Nations entity other than UNSOS, and *welcomes* the intention to continue to work towards identifying the best mechanism;

Logistical Support

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM and 70 AMISOM civilians, the SNA on joint operations with AMISOM, and UNSOM, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2245 and *requests* the Secretary-General to expedite the necessary procedures to implement resolution 2245;

33. *Requests* the AU, the United Nations and troop-contributing countries to jointly determine the equipment requirements for AMISOM and to conclude negotiations on the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) without delay, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report on the status of the tripartite MOUs in his regular reporting;

Somalia

34. *Welcomes* President Hassan Sheikh's and the FGS's commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process in 2016 and *underlines* the Council's expectation that there should not be an extension of electoral process timelines for either the executive or legislative branches, *underlines* the importance of implementing the electoral process set out in the 22 May 2016 Presidential decree without further delay, *calls on* all parties to engage constructively to achieve this and *emphasizes* that this year's electoral process is a critical step towards one person one vote elections in 2020 and in this regard *urges* the National Leadership Forum to adopt a roadmap to the 2020 elections;

35. *Underlines* the need to ensure progress in the constitutional review process without further delay in order to establish an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration, and *underlines* in this regard the importance of supporting the peaceful and inclusive completion of the state formation process and providing effective mediation when necessary and *encourages* close dialogue between the FGS, regional administrations, civil society and the Somali public in this regard;

36. *Calls on* President Hassan Sheikh and the FGS to implement commitments to security sector reform, including on increasing the transparency and accountability of security sector financial management, and to deliver early implementation of the endorsed national security policy, resulting in a clear, sustainable and agreed architecture of security sector institutions, *urges* the President and FGS to undertake this comprehensive security sector reform as soon as possible, including by providing timely, regular and predictable payment of stipends for the SNA, and *underlines* in this regard the need to ensure full and regular consultation with, and support from, all Federal states and Interim Regional Administrations;

37. *Welcomes* the FGS' active engagement with the Universal Periodic Review Process and encourages implementation by states of all accepted recommendations;

38. *Expresses* concern at continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscores* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for such violations and abuses, *welcomes* the recent passage of legislation to establish Somalia's National Human Rights Commission, *encourages* its rapid formation and *further encourages* the FGS to pass legislation aimed at protecting human rights and ensuring investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses;

39. *Expresses* concern at the increase in forced evictions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from public and private infrastructure in major towns in Somalia, *stresses* that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, *calls upon* the FGS and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and *encourages* the FGS, with the support of partners, to create an environment conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return, local integration or resettlement of IDPs;

40. *Expresses* concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* the increase in attacks against humanitarian workers and calls on all parties to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and assets; further *condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia; *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger leadership role in coordination of humanitarian response;

41. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, by all actors in Somalia;

42. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, *recalls* in this regard Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), *notes* that women are not adequately represented in the assemblies of the new interim regional administrations and *urges* the FGS and Interim Regional Administrations to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions, including meeting the agreed 30% quota for women in both houses of the Federal Parliament in the 2016 electoral process, and *encourages* UNSOM to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, and religious leaders in order to ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes;

43. *Welcomes* Somalia's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and *calls* for increased implementation of the two Action Plans signed in 2012 and strengthening of the legal framework for the protection of children, especially in light of continued abductions and unlawful recruitment and use of children in armed conflict as well as detention of children for association with armed groups as detailed in the annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict of 20 April 2016 (S/2016/360), and *encourages* the FGS to consider the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict;

Reporting

44. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 12 September 2016, and every 120 days thereafter;

45. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

Units to be generated:

- (a) A training team of 220 troops to assist the coordination and consolidation of bilateral training on one agreed instruction doctrine and to take the lead in training, mentoring and partnering the SNA;
- (b) Logistics Mission Enabling Units of 190 personnel per sector and 240 personnel at headquarters to reinforce command and control as well as to upgrade linkages between sector commands and AMISOM Headquarters in line with the expansion of operations;
- (c) An engineering unit of 190 personnel;
- (d) A signals unit of 117 personnel;
- (e) Port Security component of 312 troops to be confined to patrols in the vicinity of key seaports and to operate jointly with Somali port security units;
- (f) Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) of six personnel;
- (g) An aviation component of up to a maximum of 3 utility helicopters and 9 attack helicopters.

RESUME

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name-Surname: Abdiwali Abdikadir Farah

Nationality: Somalia

Place and Date of Birth:

Tel:

Email:

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Date of graduation
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science	City University of Mogadishu	2020

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Institution	Duty
2010-2017	Somalia Presidential Guards (Villa Somalia)	Commander Office Staff
2018-2020	Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation-Somalia	Civil Servant

FOREIGN LANGUAGE

English- C1

Turkish- C1

Arabic- B1

Somali- Native language

TURKISH SUMMRY

Somali'nin merkezi hükümeti 1991 yılında çökmüş, ülke iç savaş ve terörizm sorunlarıyla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. El-Şebab, 2007 yılında İslami Mahkemeler Birliği (ICU) liderliğinde yükselmiş ve Geçici Federal Hükümet (TFG) için bir tehdit oluşturmuştur. Bu durum Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Misyonu'nun (AMISOM) konuşlandırılmasına yol açmıştır. Etiyopya, Kenya, Cibuti, Uganda, Burundi birliklerinden oluşan ve 2007 yılında başlayan misyon, Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Geçiş Misyonu (ATMIS) olarak değiştirilmiştir ve 2022 yılına kadar sürmüştür. AMISOM misyonu, Somali'nin misyon başladığından beri güvensiz olması nedeniyle büyük zorluklarla karşılaşmıştır ve bu karamsarlığı kaldırmak için birkaç unsur bir araya gelmiştir. Birlik gönderen ülkelerin (TCC) farklı bir gündemi olduğu için misyona katkıda bulunan ülkeler iyi bir başlangıç yapamamıştır. Askerî katkı yapan ülkeler öncelikle mali çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmişlerdir. Afrika Birliği-BM arasında askeri bir barış operasyonunun 2007 başlarında Mogadişu'daki koşullara uygun bir yanıt olup olmadığı konusunda anlaşmazlıklar olmuştur. Dış aktörler Somali'deki duruma nasıl müdahale edileceği konusunda ortak düşüncelere sahip olmamıştır. Buna ek olarak BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-moon, güvenliğin sağlanamaması nedeniyle Somali'de barışı koruma misyonunun konuşlandırılmasının gerçekçi ve uygulanabilir olduğundan şüphe duymuştur.

Ancak, on beş yılı aşkın bir süredir AMISOM'un Somali'yi tam olarak istikrara kavuşturamamasının nedeni yeterince araştırılmamıştır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma bu boşluğu bir ölçüde doldurmaya ve AMISOM'un Somali'nin istikrarına katkıda bulunup bulunmadığına, misyonun hedeflerinin eleştirel bir değerlendirmesini yaparak odaklanmıştır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, misyonun Somali'de verilen görevleri tam olarak yerine getirmesini engelleyen faktörlerin neler olduğunu araştırmıştır. Çalışmanın odaklandığı araştırma sorusu, Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Misyonu'nun (AMISOM) karşılaştığı zorlukların neler olduğudur. Bu araştırma, Somali'nin istikrarı ve AMISOM hakkında literatüre katkıda bulunacak değerli ve ampirik bilgi üretmeyi amaçlamıştır.

Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde Somali'deki çatışmanın genel bir değerlendirmesi yapılmıştır. Bu bölüm, 1960 yılında devlet olmasından bu yana Somali'deki çatışmayı özetlemiştir. Somali'deki çatışmanın aşamaları mevcuttur ve karmaşık bir yapıda gözükmektedir. Bu nedenle Somali'deki çatışmayı dair genel bir derleme, AMISOM misyonuna ilk etapta neden ihtiyaç duyulduğuna ışık tutmaya çalışmıştır. AMISOM'un karşılaştığı zorlukların daha kolay anlaşılmasını sağlamak ve AMISOM'a ihtiyaç duyulana kadar Somali'nin içinden geçtiği duruma dair kapsamlı bir bakış açısı sunmak amacıyla Somali'deki çatışma genel hatlarıyla ele alınmıştır.

Somali'deki çatışma çok katmanlı bir çatışma olup Savaş Lordları, Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah (AIAl), İslami Mahkemeler Birliği (ICU) gibi İslamcı gruplar ile El-Şebab gibi terörist aktörleri içermektedir. Bu gruplar Somali'deki silahlı çatışmaya katılmış ve istikrarsızlıkta önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Çatışmanın belirli senaryoları arasında güç mücadeleleri, klan dinamikleri, terörizm ve komşu ülkelerin doğrudan müdahaleleri, yani Etiyopya işgalleri de dahil olmak üzere dış müdahaleler yer almaktadır. Çatışma silahlı klan milislerini ve silahlı teröristleri içermektedir. Güç mücadelesi meselesi 1960'larda cumhuriyetin doğuşuyla başlamıştır. Öte yandan, bu bölgede klanlar arası çatışmalar yaygın olarak kabul gören Xeer aracılığıyla çözülmektedir.

Somali'nin güncel çatışmalarının kronolojisine bakıldığında, ülkede birçok askeri darbe girişimi olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak 1969'da General Siyad Barre liderliğindeki askeri darbe başarılı bir şekilde yönetilen tek darbe olmuştur. Somali'yi Sovyet yanlısı, tek partili bir devlete dönüştürmüştür. Bu rejimin çok sıkı bir yönetim sistemi olmuştur. Cunta, cumhuriyetin ilk cumhurbaşkanı da dahil olmak üzere devlet adamlarını, siyasetçileri ve askeri yönetime muhalif görünen tüm aktörleri tutuklamıştır.

“Büyük Somali” anlayışı milliyetçi devlet kavramları arasındaydı. Bu durum 1977'de Ogaden bölgesinde Etiyopya-Somali savaşına yol açmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği, Küba ve Yemen'in yardımıyla Etiyopya Somali'yi mağlup etmiştir. Bu olay Somali'nin durumunu istikrarsız hale getirmiştir. İki ülke grupları silahlandırmaya başlamıştır. Somali Kurtuluş Demokratik Cephesi (SSDF), Somali Ulusal Hareketi (SNM) ve

Birleşik Somali Kongresi (USC) yükselmeye başlamıştır. Daha sonra Somalili silahlı gruplar General Siyad Barre'yi zorla görevden almış, ülke iç savaş ve kaosun içine düşmüştür.

BM Güvenlik Konseyi ilk kez 1993-1994 yıllarında Somali'de Birleşmiş Milletler Operasyonlarının (UNISOM) konuşlandırılmasını onaylamak için Beşinci Bölümü yürürlüğe koymuş ve bu operasyonlar insani yardım operasyonlarından barış sağlama operasyonlarına dönüştürülmüştür (UNISOM I, UNISOM II ve UNITAF). Misyon, ABD'nin General Mohamed Farah Aided ile 'Mogadişu Savaşı' ya da 'Kara Şahin Düştü' olarak bilinen 18 ABD deniz piyadesinin öldürülüp Mogadişu sokaklarında sürüklendiği çatışmaya girmesi ve ABD'nin Somali'deki güçlerini geri çekmesiyle sona ermiştir. Ancak Somali'deki çatışma devam etmiş ve daha da kötüleşmiştir.

İslamcı örgütlerin ortaya çıkışı, Mısır ve Suudi Arabistan'da eğitim gören ve selefilik ideolojisini taşıyan öğrencilerin Somali'ye dönüp nüfuz kazanmak için alan arayışına girmesiyle kronikleşmeye başlamıştır. Ardından devletin çöküşü onlar için altın bir fırsat olmuştur. AIAI, bölgelerin kontrolünü ele geçiren ilk silahlı İslamcı milis olmuştur. AIAI, Barri bölgesinde Albay Abdillahi Yusuf'un, Kismayo'da General Mohamed Farah Aidid'in ve 1996'da Gedo bölgesinde Etiyopya birliklerinin üçlü saldırılarını yenilgiye uğratmıştır.

Somali için bir uzlaşma konferansı düzenlenmiştir. Bu sayede en verimli konferans 2000 yılındaki Arta Cibuti Konferansı olmuştur. Bu konferansta bir Ulusal Geçiş Hükümeti (TNG) kurulmuş ancak Mogadişu'daki güçlü savaş ağalarının meydan okumaları nedeniyle önemli bir ilerleme kaydedilememiştir. Bir başka TFG 2004 yılında Kenya'da kurulmuştur. Bu hükümet Mogadişu'ya taşınmadan önce Jowhar'a sonra ardından Badio'ya taşınmıştır. Ancak ICU bir tehlike tehdidi oluşturmuş ve bu nedenle 2006'da Etiyopya'dan bir işgalle sonuçlanmıştır. Cibuti'de bir kez daha, Başkan Yusuf'un 2009'da istifa etmesinin ardından ICU'nun eski lideri başkan olarak seçilmiştir.

Etiyopya hükümeti, ABD hükümetinin yardımıyla ICU'nun önde gelen aşırıçılığını kullanarak 2006'da Somali'yi tekrar işgal etmek için gerekçe olarak kullanmıştır. ICU'nun silahsızlandırılması El-Şebab'ın önünü açmıştır. Bu yeni örgüt, Somali tarihindeki en ölümcül ve en aşırıcı örgüt olmuş, Başkan Yusuf hükümeti için yeni bir tehlike haline gelmiş, Afrika Birliğinin dikkatini yoğunlaştırarak AMISOM'un kurulmasını sağlamıştır.

Günümüz Somali'sinde yaşanan çatışmalar, durumun giderek düşmanca bir hal aldığı göstermektedir. Somali kırılganlığını koruduğu ve güçlü bir hükümetten yoksun olduğu için girişimler ülkede tam istikrarı sağlayamamıştır. Ayrıca silahlı İslamcıların 1996'dan bu yana istikrar çabalarını tehlikeye attığı görülmektedir. AMISOM ise bu silahlı terörist örgüt El-Şebab'ın seyrinde kurulmuştur. Bu kapsamda, Somali'nin istikrarı için en uzun, en kapsamlı çaba 2007'den beri aktif olan AMISOM misyonu olmuştur. On beş yıllık varlığı süresince AMISOM'un başarıları ve karşılaştığı çeşitli zorluklar olmuştur.

İkinci bölümde AMISOM'un yapısı ve işlevleri hakkında detaylar sunulmuştur. Bu kapsamda AMISOM misyonunun neyi amaçladığı ve kurumsal olarak nasıl yapılandığı incelenmiştir. Bu bölüm, AMISOM'un kuruluşunun anlatısıyla başlamıştır. AMISOM'un kuruluş süreci Somali Cumhurbaşkanı Yusuf'un AU birliklerini Somali'ye konuşlandırmaya davet etmesiyle başlamıştır. Takiben, Doğu Afrika bölgesel bloğunun IGASOM'u kurmaya yönelik başarısız girişimleri ve AU'nun misyona liderlik etmek üzere geri dönüş rolü bu bölümde ele alınmıştır.

Bu çerçevede, BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarından AMISOM'a ilişkin olan 1477 (2007), 2010 (2011), 2073 (2012), 2182 (2014), 2297 (2016), 2372 (2017) 2472 (2019) ile ATMIS'e ilişkin 2628 (2022) nolu kararlar ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmıştır. AMISOM'un ilgili yetkilendirilmeleri ile çalışma, misyonun yerine getirmekle yükümlü olduğu görevler, ödevler ve stratejik hedefleri net bir şekilde ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. AMISOM'un bu görevleri tam anlamıyla yerine getirip getiremediği konusu ve bu yolda karşılaştığı zorluklar üçüncü bölümde ele alınmıştır. Bu bölümde ayrıca misyona katkıda bulunan ülkelerin (TCCs) listesi,

misyona görevlendirilen asker sayısı ve misyonun Güney Somali'de konuşlandığı sektörler sunulurken, misyonun organizasyon yapısı da aydınlatılmıştır.

Literatür, AMISOM'a olan ihtiyacın daha önce önerilen IGADSOM misyonunun konuşlandırılmamasının ortaya çıktığını göstermektedir. Bu ihtiyaç hem AU hem de IGAD olağanüstü toplantılarında dile getirilmiş, TFG'nin Kenya'dan Cevher'e, ardından Baido'ya taşınmasından sonra Somali'de işlevselliğini sürdürmesine yardımcı olmak amacıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu esnada ICU, TFG'ye ev sahipliği yapan Baido'ya saldırmaya yemin ettiği için TFG'yi tehlikeye atmıştır. Etiyopya birlikleri TFG'yi korumak için Somali'yi işgal etmiş ve ICU ile çatışmış, ICU yenilmiştir. Ancak El-Şebab dağıtılan ICU'nun küllerinden doğmuş ve zayıf TFG'yi tehlikeye sokmuştur.

Ocak 2007'de kurulan AMISOM misyonunun konuşlanması, BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararları gereğince zaman içerisinde 22.146 askere ulaşmıştır. Misyonun görev süresi 2007'den 2022'ye kadar uzatılmış, bu süre zarfında misyona BM Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından çeşitli görevler, stratejik hedefler verilmiştir. Misyon aynı zamanda Avrupa Birliği'nden de mali yardım almıştır AB'nin AMISOM'a 2,3 milyar Avro fon sağladığı belirtilmiştir. AB ayrıca, sonrasında kurulan ATMIS'i desteklemeye devam edeceğini garanti etmiştir. Bu noktaya ek olarak, BM misyona lojistik destek sağlamış ve sahada bir BM ofisi bulundurmuştur. AMISOM misyonu 1 Nisan 2022'de sona ermiştir. Yerini AMISOM'u devam ettirmek üzere 12 aylık yetkiye sahip Somali'deki Afrika Birliği Geçiş Misyonu (ATMIS) almıştır. Yeni misyon, kısa süre önce dağılan AMISOM'un mali desteğini ve birliklerini devralmıştır.

Güvenlik Konseyi Kararlarına daha derinlemesine bakıldığında, görevlerin temel önceliklerinin hükümetin korunması, beklenen konuşlanma sayısına ulaşılması olduğu görülmüştür. Kurtarılmış bölgelerdeki sektörlerin idaresi, uzlaşmaların sağlanması üzerinde çalışılmıştır. En önemli görevi ise El-Şebab'a karşı operasyonlar yürüterek El-Şebab tehdidini azaltmak olmuştur. Aynı zamanda misyon, Somali Güvenlik Güçleri ile ortak operasyonlar yürütmek ve kurtarılan bölgelerdeki yerel halkla ilişkiler kurmakla görevlendirilmiştir. Misyondan güvenlik sorumluluklarının yerel güçlere devredilmesi için istikrarlı bir şekilde çalışması istenmiştir.

AMISOM'un yetkilerine derinlemesine bakıldığında, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin ortaya çıkan zorluklar nedeniyle zaman içerisinde misyonun yetkilerini genişlettiği ve öncelikli stratejik hedeflerini değiştirdiği görülmüştür. On beş yıldan fazla süren misyonun görevleri temelde karışık ya da karmaşık olmasa da süreç içinde sahadaki gerçeklik ile beklenen sonuçlar farklılaşmıştır.

Birinci ve ikinci bölümlerde Somali'deki çatışma ve AMISOM'un doğası hakkında genel bir bakış sunduktan sonra, çalışma misyonun karşılaştığı zorlukları değerlendirmeye çalışmıştır. Üçüncü bölüm, çalışmanın ana araştırma sorusunu yanıtlamış ve misyonun başarısını ve karşılaştığı zorlukları değerlendirmiştir. AMISOM'un Somali'deki operasyonları sırasında elde ettiği başarılar, karşılaştığı zorluklarla birlikte ele alınmıştır. Görevin başarısının ya da aksaklıkların yaşandığı alanlar derinlemesine, eleştirel bir şekilde analiz edilmiştir.

Mevcut literatürün analizinde, çalışma AMISOM'un Federal hükümeti, gerçekleştirdiği operasyonları ve misyonun resmi sitesinde iddia ettiği diğer önemli başarıları koruduğunu tespit edilmiştir. Misyonun, El-Şebab'ın kökünü kazıma, güvenli bir şekilde insani yardım sağlama ve yönetimin geri dönüşünün sağlanmasına yardımcı olma konularında başarıları olduğunu belirtilmiştir. Misyonun, başkent sadece 4 bölgesinin Somali hükümetinin kontrolü altında olduğu, diğer 12 bölgenin ise teröristler tarafından işgal edildiği bir dönemde konuşlandırıldığı önemli bir gerçektir. Bu süreçte, AMISOM'un Somali'de barış ve güvenliği yeniden tesis ettiği, Mogadişu da dahil olmak üzere teröristleri püskürterek çeşitli bölgeleri geri kazandığı görülmüştür. AMISOM, Somali'de hem bölgesel hem de federal yönetim sisteminin yeniden tesis edilmesine yardımcı olmuştur.

Ayrıca Mogadişu'da güvenliğin artırılması için hükümetin Türkiye'nin desteğiyle havaalanları ve limanlar gibi kilit ekonomik altyapıları yeniden inşa etmeye başladığı da görülmüştür. El-Şebab'ın başkent Mogadişu'daki güçlü varlığını kaybetmesi Somali hükümeti açısından "Somali halkı için altın bir zafer" olmuştur.

Öte yandan, AMISOM'un karşılaştığı bazı zorluklar misyonu beklenenden daha az ilerleme kaydetmeye zorladı. Misyonu katkı sunan ülkeler arasında çatışan çıkarların mevcut olması misyonun başarısını etkileyen bir unsur olmuştur. Ayrıca, lojistik ve mali zorluklar yaşanırken, bölünmüş komuta kademeleri ve birliklerin misyon üzerinde olumsuz etkileri olmuştur. AMISOM'un Somali Ulusal Ordusu (SNA) ile ilişkileri bozulmuş, suiistimaller ve sivil kayıplar yaşanırken misyonun İleri Operasyon Üslerinde (FOB'lar) güvenlik açığı ortaya çıkmıştır.

Asker katkısında bulunan altı ülkenin misyonda farklılaşan ulusal çıkarları olduğu görülmüştür. Bu çıkarlar arasında terörizme karşı uluslararası bir müttefik olarak imajlarını güçlendirmek, askeri yeteneklerine yatırım almak yer alırken, komşu ülkelerin misyon üzerinde hem stratejik hem de güvenlik çıkarları oluşmuştur. Kenya ile Etiyopya arasında misyon üzerindeki bu çatışan ulusal çıkarlar AMISOM'un Somali'de istikrarı sağlamasının zayıf noktaları arasındadır. Literatür, misyonun kuruluşunun komşu ülkelerin siyasi, güvenlik çıkarları uğruna aceleye getirildiğini de eklemiştir. Planlayıcılar, misyonun rolünü hükümetin korunmasıyla sınırlandırdıkları için sahadaki tehdit değerlendirmesi gerçekçi görülmemiştir.

Misyon, görevin başarısı konusunda bir ikilemeyle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Afrika Birliği ile BM, askeri bir barış operasyonunun 2007 başlarında Mogadişu'daki koşullara uygun bir yanıt olup olmadığı konusunda farklı endişelere sahip olmuştur. Buna ek olarak, AMISOM'a yeterli yetkilerin verilmemesine neden olan temel sorunlar da vardır. Misyon, görevleri, başarı mekanizmaları ve mevcut stratejisi hakkında yeterli rehberlik alamamıştır.

Misyonun mali ve lojistik zorlukları da olmuştur. Bu durum, misyonun genişlemesi ve operasyonların sürekliliği için bir çıkmaz oluşturmuş, AMISOM'un zorunlu görevlerini yerine getirmesini zorlaştırmıştır.

Örneğin, misyonun sadece üç helikopteri vardı ve bu helikopterler 4,000 km² lik tüm görev operasyonunu kapsayamamıştır. Misyonun liderliği, birliklerin hazır olduğunu ancak kaynak yetersizliği nedeniyle hareket edemediğini savunmuştur. Bu durum El-Şebab militanlarına karşı zor kazanılan mücadeleyi ATMIS'e geçerken tehlikeye

atabilecek düzeye gelmiştir. BM siyasi işler şefi, finansman sağlamanın kritik, gerekli olduğunu vurgulamış ve bu durumun güvenliği Somali Güvenlik Güçlerine devretme planlarını tehlikeye atabileceğini belirtmiştir. Bu süreçte birliklere katkıda bulunan ülkelerin bazıları fon sorunları nedeniyle misyondan çekilmiş, bazıları da fon ihtiyaçları karşılanmazsa çekilebileceklerini belirtmişlerdir. Etiyopya birlikleri 2016'da AMISOM'dan çekilmiş, daha sonra yeniden katılmıştır. Uganda da bu konuyu vurgulamış ve uluslararası ortakların ihtiyaç duyulan desteği sağlamaması halinde kuvvetlerini geri çekme tehdidinde bulunmuştur.

Komuta kademelerinde bölünmeler oluşmuştur. Bu nedenle sektör bölümleri TCC'leri doğrudan kendi birliklerine yönlendirmekteydi. Emir ve talimatları askerlerinden alıyordu. TCC'ler El-Şebab ile mücadele etmek için bireysel olarak hareket ettiğinden misyonun tutarlı, tanımlanmış bir kurumsal çerçevesi yoktu. Zayıf bir karargâh ve boşluk pozisyonu mevcutken misyonun hedefi savaştan istikrar sağlamaya kalmıştır. Zayıf karargâh nedeniyle 2015'in ilk yarısında misyon ivme kaybetmiştir. Kuvvet komutanları ve komutan yardımcıları gibi kilit AMISOM liderlik pozisyonlarında, asker katkısı yapan ülkelerin yerlerine birini bulma konusundaki sınırlı istekliliğinden kaynaklanan bir boşluk oluşmuştur. AU, Nairobi'de misyonun on yılı üzerine bir konferans düzenleyerek misyonun komuta zincirinin kırıldığını kabul etmiştir.

SNA-AMISOM arasındaki işbirliği ve ilişkiler, var olan güvensizliğin bir sonucu olarak bozulmuştur. Bu da misyonun sorunsuz çalışmasına, yürütülmesine zarar vermiştir. Bu durum mevcut geçiş misyonu ATMIS'e de sirayet etmiştir. SNA, FGS ve Somalili aydınlar arasında AMISOM'a sağlanan fonların Somalililere (SNA) verilmesi halinde El-Şebab'ın sona erdirilebileceğine dair güçlü bir his oluşmuştur. AMISOM ve SNA bir uyum stratejisinden yoksun kalmıştır. Bozulan ilişkiler 2021'de SNA tarafından tek taraflı bir operasyonla sonuçlanmıştır. Hatırlatmak gerekirse, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 2016 yılında aldığı 2297 sayılı karar, misyonu Somali Güvenlik güçleriyle ortak operasyonlar yürütmekle görevlendirilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu ilkesel açıdan tanımlanmış görevlere aykırı olmuştur ve misyona zarar vermiştir.

AMISOM birlikleri iyi yönetilmemiş eylemler yürütmüş ve sivil zayıflara neden olmuştur. Literatür, AMISOM birliklerine bağlı Uganda Halk Savunma Güçleri'nin (UPDF) kendilerine sağlanan lojistik ve donanımı satarken suçüstü yakalandığını ve suçluların Mogadişu'da mahkûm edildiğini göstermiştir. Benzer şekilde, UPDF üyeleri 2021 yılında Golweyn köyünde sivilleri öldürmekten suçlu bulunmuştur. Bu nedenle ilgili suçlular mahkeme tarafından ölüm cezasına çarptırılmıştır. İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü, AMISOM personeli tarafından 21'den fazla cinsel sömürü ve istismar vakasını belgelenmiş, insani yardım paketlerinin teslimatı sırasında savunmasız kadın ve kız çocuklarından faydalanıldığı belirlenmiştir. AMISOM birlikleri sektörlere ayrıldığından bu birimler üslerinde konuşlanmış ve İleri Operasyon Üslerinde (FOB'lar) kalmaya devam etmiştir. Bu durağanlık El-Şebab'a, son olarak Buulo-Mareer'deki UPDF üssü olan AMISOM üslerine saldırma, karmaşık saldırılar düzenleme fırsatı vermiştir.

AMISOM'un ilk görevini yerine getirdiği, hükümetin çökmesini engellediği, otoritesini El-Şebab'a karşı koruduğu görülmüştür. Ancak, AMISOM'un karşılaştığı zorlukların misyonun kendisinden beklenenleri gerçekleştirmesini engellediği görülmüştür. AMISOM'un kendisine verilen görevin azını yerine getirdiği ve on beş yıllık varlığının ardından tekrar eden zorlukların üstesinden gelemediği söylenebilir.

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, misyonun 2007-2022 yılları arasında karşılaştığı zorlukları ve aksaklıkları irdelemiştir. Çalışma, misyonun başarısında ve aynı zamanda yürüttüğü aktif mücadelede sorun teşkil eden temel unsurların katkıda bulunan ülkelerin çatışan çıkarları ve birlikler arasındaki bölünme olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca, misyonun lojistik ve mali zorluklar yaşadığı ve bölünmüş komuta kademeleri ve sektör bölünmeleri neticesinde olumsuzlar yaşadığı görülmüştür. AMISOM'un Somali Ulusal Ordusu (SNA) ile ilişkilerinin bozuk olması, kötü yönetilen operasyonlar ve sivil kayıplar da bu sorunlara eklenmiş, misyonun İleri Operasyon Üslerinde (FOB'lar) güvenlik açıkları doğmuştur.

Bu koşullar altında çalışma, birliklerin gelecekteki AU misyonlarında düşmanca bir ortama düşmemesi için durumun derinlemesine incelenmesi, değerlendirme yapılması gerektiğini öne çıkarmıştır. AMISOM örneğinde, ön değerlendirme

kararlarında eksikliklerin olduđu görülmüştür. Yeterli kaynak sağlamanın önemi, AU'nun veya diđer misyonların sorunsuz çalışmasında hayati bir rol oynayabileceđi görülmüş, bu nedenle misyon kurulmadan önce misyonun fonlarının organize edilmesinin öneminin altı çizilmiştir. AMISOM misyonu, AU'nun şimdiye kadar yönettiđi en büyük misyon olmuş ve ihtiyaç duyulan kaynakları üretmekte başarısız kalmıştır. Bu konu gelecekteki misyonlar için bir ders niteliğindedir. Bu nedenle önemli ve yeterli kaynak sağlandıktan sonra benzer misyonların oluşturulması uygun olabilecek bir unsurdur.

Bu açıdan ATMIS misyonu kritik bir dönemeç teşkil etmiştir. Yukarıda belirtilen zorlukların ATMIS'i de etkilediđi çok açıktır. ATMIS'in görev bitiş tarihini göz önüne alarak ilgili zorluklar konusunda önlemler alması önem arz eder görülmektedir. Somali örneğinde açıkça görüldüğü üzere, yerel ortaklar misyonlar için sahada ihtiyaç duyulan çok önemli bir paydaş olmuştur. Bu nedenle, Somali yerel güçlerine gelecekteki görevler için ve mevcut ATMIS kapsamında öncelik verilmesi olumlu etkiler doğurabilecek bir unsurdur. Bu şekilde, yerel güçler gelecekte ATMIS'den yetkiyi devralacak şekilde geleceğin güvenlik sağlayıcıları olarak değerlendirilebilir.

AMISOM hükümetin korunmasına ilişkin temel görevini belli oranda yerine getirirse de, karşılaştığı bütçe ve lojistik sorunları, asker gönderen ülkelerin ulusal çıkarlarının çatışması, emir komuta zincirinin bozulması, yerel güçlerle işbirliği eksikliği ve İleri Operasyon Üslerindeki (FOB'lar) güvenlik açıkları gibi zorluklar misyonun çalışmasını olumsuz etkileyen ve işlevlerini sınırlayan faktörler olarak değerlendirilmiştir.